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INTRODUCTION

Nearly two decades ago, the Supreme Court for the first time affirmatively recognized a right to public and press access to criminal
trials as grounded in the First and Ninth Amendments' and at least
suggested, without reaching the question, that such a right may be
implicit with regard to civil trials as well.2 Since that time, the Court
has expanded and strengthened this right of access by rejecting
mandatory closure rules,' extending access to voir dire,4 and opening pretrial hearings.! To date, the Supreme Court has yet to answer
whether the right of access extends to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Examination of modern juvenile proceedings, however, reveals
* Attorney, Bingham Dana L.L.P., Boston; B.S., University of Utah, 1993; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1997. I would like to thank Professor Laurence H. Tribe for
the considerable energy and time he devoted to editing this Article, as well as tirelessly responding to my incessant e-mail queries. I would also like to thank Jonathan M. Albano for his continued assistance. With his generous permission, I have
borrowed many of Mr. Albano's insights into this topic. Thanks also to Kara Parmelee for her invaluable assistance in editing the article. Finally, a thanks to my wife,
Tamara C.W. Dalton, for her constant support and input throughout the writing of
this manuscript.
I See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
2 See id. n.17 ("Whether the public has a right to attend trials
of civil cases is a
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal
trials have been presumptively open."). Later in the same case, Justice Stewart
noted in his concurrence that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give
the press and the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal." Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring).
3 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982).
4 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1984)
[hereinafter Press Entetprise1].
See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1993);
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1986) [hereinafter PressEnterse fl.
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that-ordinarily at least-there is no functionally meaningful distinction between a juvenile delinquency adjudication and an adult
criminal trial. Public scrutiny serves an important function in our
system of self-government, and access would bring benefits to a troubled juvenile justice system. It is my conclusion, therefore, that
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny should and do apply to juvenile
proceedings, thereby requiring that such proceedings be presumptively open to the press and public.
To address properly the debate over media access to delinquency proceedings, it is necessary to study two major issues: first,
the doctrine the Supreme Court has developed for addressing requests by the press, media, or other representatives of the public to
attend a criminal justice proceeding and, second, the state of the juvenile justice system in general and delinquency proceedings specifically. This Article will survey the issue of access to juvenile delinquency proceedings by examining both of these components
independently before considering how the two interact.
Part I provides an overview of the rationale used by the Supreme
Court in answering access questions in the past, evaluating each of
the Court's major access 6 cases. Part II takes a closer look at the twopart test the Court has developed to address access issues and examines what each element of the Court's test has come to mean today.
In order to provide a solid point of departure, my analysis of Supreme Court precedent in Parts I and II will be general. Having established the access elements, I will then focus on juvenile proceedings as the case in point. In Part III, I suggest functionalism as a
methodology with which to carry out my examination of the juvenile
justice system. I point to Supreme Court decisions that apply a functional analysis of empirical elements for a study of this kind of First
Amendment issue. I argue that such an analysis requires looking
past the labels and rhetoric surrounding an issue and toward a substantive understanding. In Part IV, I apply the functional analysis
recommended in Part III by examining the history, hyperbole, and
reality of the juvenile justice system and delinquency proceedings.
Part V then applies the Supreme Court tests discussed in Parts I and
II to juvenile proceedings as seen through the functional analysis of
6 For the purpose of clarity, "access" in this paper refers to the ability of the
press and public to attend a given criminal justice proceeding for the purpose of
providing public scrutiny. Therefore, by this definition, a proceeding would still be
considered open despite ajudge placing reasonable limitations on the total number
of individual members of the press and public in attendance. See generaly Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (discussing "access" in the criminal justice proceeding context).
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Part IV. I examine whether there is sufficient support to attach a
presumptive right of access to delinquency proceedings. I then consider the possible countervailing arguments against granting such
access, resolving finally that Supreme Court precedent and the state
of the juvenile justice system call for a presumptive right of access to
juvenile delinquency proceedings. Lastly, Part VI offers some parting thoughts on the issue of media access to juvenile delinquency
proceedings.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT'S CASES ADDRESSING PUBLIC
ACCESS TO CRIMINALJUSTICE PROCEEDINGS

In a nation founded on a healthy distrust of its own government, the public's ability to observe and scrutinize that government
in action has always been important.7 The Constitution reflects the
Framers' valuation of public observation as an inhibitor of a tyrannical government. Not only does the Sixth Amendment specifically
provide for a "public trial," but both the Sixth and Seventh Amendments8 mandate jury trials-the jury long recognized as a tool for
public scrutiny, providing parties protection "against possible oppression by what is in essence an appeal to the community conscience, as embodied in the jury .... ." These amendments indicate
a deep conviction that public participation in the government generally, and in the judiciary specifically, plays an important role in the
larger system of checks and balances. 0 The First Amendment" furSee Potter Stewart, "Or of the Rress", 26 HASTINcS LJ. 631, 63-34 (1975)
(arguing that the First Amendment's explicit protection of the press shows the
Framers' desire that the public, via the press, should monitor the activities of the
government).
a The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " U.S. CONsr.
amend. VI. The Seventh Amendment reads, "In Suits at common law, where the
value of the controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be

preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
in the United States, than according to rules of the common law." U.S. CoNsr.
amend. VII.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554-55 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
0 Se Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). As the
Court in Globe Newspaper stated: "And in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial
process--an essential component in our structure of self-government." Id.
" The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
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ther protects this vital public check not only through its protection
of the ability to speak one's mind, but also the ability of the press to
provide information to make that speech informed The freedoms of
speech and press, then, must also encompass a freedom to listen."
Especially where people have neither the time nor the inclination to
observe the judicial system first hand,"34 the press has developed into
the "eyes and ears" of the body politic.

That the public, with and through the press, has some right to
observe the judiciary in action does not, of course, end discussion of
the access question. As with many other rights, the interests or rights
of one group may clash, or at least conflict, with the interests or
rights of another. Thus, while there may be some right of access to
the courtroom in the abstract, how that right affects other considerations, like the right to a fair trial,' 5 or the state's concern for the privacy or the confidentiality of those involved in the judicial system, 6
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
12 Speaking specifically about the criminal justice system, Laurence H. Tribe argues that meaningful First Amendment protection of access to such proceedings
must acknowledge that a courtroom is "a public forum for watching and listening,
rather than a forum for spech." LAURENC E H. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrlIONAL LAW
§ 12-20, at 965 (2d ed. 1988). Dissenting in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,Justice Stevens
sounded a similar chord by arguing that the First Amendment, to serve its purpose
of protecting an informed self-governing democracy, must not only protect speech
and the press but the "acquisition of information about the operation of public institutions .... ."Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (invalidating
a federal statute restricting the flow of mail deemed "communist political propaganda" to the addressee as a "limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's First Amendment rights").
isThe general public's lack of attendance in the modem courtroom is in contrast to conditions during colonial times. As ChiefJustice Burger noted in Richmond
Newspapers, "In earlier times, both in England and America, attendance at court was
a common mode of 'passing the time.'" Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). ChiefJustice Burger explained the trend away from that phenomenon over time: "With the press,
cinema, and electronic media now supplying the representations or reality of the
real life drama once available only in the courtroom, attendance at court is no
longer a widespread pastime." Id. This is even more the case today, with the proliferation of cameras in the courtroom.
14 "One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public should know
what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens there, to the end
that the public may judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair and right."
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
5 See Gannett Co. v DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-84 (1979)
(weighing the
right
16 of access against the defendant's right to a fair trial).
See generally Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)
(weighing the right of access against the state's interest in protecting juvenile witnesses from trauma associated in testifying about sexual assault).
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remains a complex and somewhat open issue. The Supreme Court
has handed down five major decisions directly addressing the question of a First Amendment right of media access to criminal justice
proceedings.17 These five cases have at least two relevant things in
common: first, they have all found a qualified First Amendment
right of access to such proceedings, in spite of various countervailing
interests 8 and, second, they have done so through various permutations of a test first developed in Chief Justice Burger's opinion and
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir1 9 often now referred to as the "experience and logic" test.
Beginia,
fore analyzing this constitutional test more closely, it is worth examining briefly how this doctrine has developed over the course of
these five major cases.
A. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia2 '
The Court first directly addressed the question of a First
Amendment right to attend judicial proceedings" in Richmond Newspapers. During his fourth trial for murder, the defendant, without
objection, successfully moved the court to close the trial to the press
and public. The motion to open the proceedings subsequently filed
by two reporters was denied, and the Virginia Supreme Court denied
their petition to appeal.2 In a plurality opinion, the United States
Supreme Court found that the closure order violated the right of access enjoyed by the public and the media under the First and Four-

17 See generally El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993);
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter PressEnterprse fl]; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984)
[hereinafter Pres-Enterprise1]; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596; Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. 555.
18 These interests include the right to a fair trial, see El Vocero, 508 U.S. at 149-50;
Pres-EnterpriseAi, 478 U.S. at 14; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 603; the privacy of minor rape victims while testifying, see Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-10; and the privacy of potential jurors, see Press-Enterprise , 464 U.S. at 511-12.
448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See Pres-EnterpriseH, 478 U.S. at 9.
21 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
2
In Gannett Co. v. DePasqua, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Court held that the accused's right to a public trial, guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment, did not give
the press or public a right of access to a pretrial hearing. See id. at 387. As Chief
Justice Burger pointed out in Richmond Newspapers, "the Court [in Gannett] did not
decide whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a right of the
public to attend trials." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564; see also TRiBE, supra
note 12, § 12-20, at 957.
23 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 562.
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teenth Amendments. 2 ' The plurality found additional suport for a
right of access to criminal trials in the Ninth Amendment, although
three Justices in concurrence found the First and Fourteenth
Amendments independently sufficient.2
Chief Justice Burger's opinion, which was joined by Justices
White and Stevens, heavily emphasized historical precedent, noting
that "throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who
cared to observe."2 Chief Justice Burger also discussed the benefits
of open trials, focusing again on historical perspectives.' While the
Chief Justice gauged past history and the benefits of access, Justice
Brennan's concurrence on the other hand explicitly suggested the
use of experience and logic as a test, dubbing them "two helpful
principles":"
First, the case for a right of access has special force when drawn
from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree into particular proceedings or information... in part because the Constitution carries the gloss of history ....Second, the value of access must be measured in specifics... what is crucial in individual
cases is whether access to a particular government process is important in terms of that very process.30
In subsequent criminal justice access cases, the Court has used
the basic considerations of experience and logic-history and benefit-as its guiding principles. The Court also considered circumstances under which even a presumptively open proceeding could be
closed. Chief Justice Burger's opinion argued that criminal courts
should be open "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in [the]
findings." s' Such formulations of standards for a countervailing interest have resurfaced and changed slightly over the course of subsequent opinions.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court"2

B.

In the wake of Richmond Newspapers, a landmark decision without a majority opinion, it was only a matter of time before the issue
&eid. at 581.
Se id. at 579-80 & n.15.
" See id. at 585 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 599 (Stewart, J.,

24

concurring).

Id. at 564.
See id. at 569.
" Richmond Newspaprs, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan,J., concurring).
so Id. (citation omitted).
31 Id. at 581.
2

2

n 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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of access to criminal justice proceedings arose again. In Globe Newspaper, the trial court closed a rape trial where the defendant had
been charged with raping three minors." In closing the proceeding,
the court relied on a state statute" designed to minimize trauma
and embarrassment to juvenile sexual assault victims by requiring
closure of criminal trials in which these victims were to testify."
Originally remanded in light of the Richmond Newspapers decision,"
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) again upheld closure, based largelyT on the "broad, paternal protection afforded children generally.""
While agreeing that the state's "interestsafeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor[was] compelling,""*the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
SJC, seven to two.
Before reaching its discussion of the experience and logic test,
the Court spoke expansively about the impact of the First Amendment on the access issue. The Court noted that the Framers were
concerned with "broad principles" in drafting the First Amendment 9
and that the Amendment was designed to protect free and informed
"discussion of governmental affairs." 40 Thus, the Globe Newspaper
Court took strong steps to adopt a broad reading of the First
Amendment as it relates to the access question. The Court then returned to the experience and logic test from Richmond Newspapers.4'
The Court held that historical openness and the important role public access plays in criminal trials made a mandatory closure rule, even
to protect minor sexual assault victims, repugnant to the Constitution.4 The Court opted instead to require the trial court to determine the need for closure on a case-by-case basis.43

s Seeid. at598.
See MAss. GEN. LAwsANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
See Globe Newspape, 457 U.S. at 599.
See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 401 N.E.2d 360 (Mass. 1980), vacated by 449 U.S. 894 (1980), remanded to 423 N.E.2d 773 (Mass. 1981), probablejurisdiction noted by 454 U.S. 1051 (1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
Globe Newspaper,423 N.E.2d at 780.
3 Globe Newspaper,457 U.S. at 607.
" See id. at 604.
40 Id. at604-05.
41 See id. at 603.
2 See id. at 605-06.
43 Id. at 607-09. The Court called on trial courts to weigh "the minor victim's
age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires
of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives." Id. at 608 (citation omitted). The discretion vested in trial court judges has raised the eyebrows of some
commentators. Laurence Tribe, for example, has posited that "permitting ad hoc
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The Globe Newspaper Court also offered further discussion of the
level of interest required to outweigh the First Amendment right:
"Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to deny the right
of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it
must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
This standard added teeth to Chief Justice Burger's "overriding interest" test,4 signaling that the Court was serious about the real constitutional importance of access.
C. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court" (Press-Enterprise1)
The affirmation of the basic tenets of the Richmond Newspapers
opinion by seven Justices in Globe Newspaper seemed to shore up the
Court's standards for dealing with access to criminal justice proceedings. What remained to be seen was how far that access would extend beyond the actual criminal trial itself. Press-EnterpriseI addressed that question when the media and public were excluded
from portions of voir dire in a rape and murder case and were later
denied a copy of the transcript of the proceedings. Arguing that
"[t]he process of juror selection is itself a matter of importance.., to the criminal justice system,"4'7 the Court seemed to have
little trouble extending Richmond Newspapers past the actual trial
stage. The Court predictably used the basic experience and logic
framework, combing through the history of access to voir dire and
decisions by the judge might result in less closure but more hidden censorship by
the government." TamE, supranote 12, § 12-20, at 961. Professor Tribe's concern is
supported by precedent; the Supreme Court has been loath to grant any official too
much unbridled censorial power, preferring strict standards to limit official discretion. Cf Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1988) (striking down an ordinance that
granted the City Manager standardless review power of parties wishing to distribute
literature; the unbounded nature of the review power established a censorial power
in violation of the First Amendment). It is precisely this kind of power, however,
that many juvenile court statutes currently grant to presidingjudges. See infranotes
195-197, 363-365, and 441-444 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
The issue ofjudicial ad hocety in the juvenile court will be discussed in Parts IV and
V infra.
"
obe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07. The fact that the state's interest was in
protecting minors from trauma makes this case especially important in the discussion ofjuvenile proceedings. See Part V infra for further discussion of this point.
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
464 U.S. 501 (1984).
47 Id. at 505. The Court has underscored the centrality of the jury to
the criminal justice system by refusing to allow peremptory challenges sought to perpetuate
racial or gender biases. See generayJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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underscoring the importance of public scrutiny in that phase of the
criminal justice process. 48 By this time the Court seemed comfortable applying the experience and logic test and finding a qualified
First Amendment right of access for any proceeding that passed the
test.a

In honing the proper standard to address countervailing interests once a First Amendment right has been established, the Court
continued to favor public and press access. The Court confirmed
that the qualified First Amendment right will almost always mandate
access, stating flatly that "[c]losed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness."' Pulling these statements together,
the Court clarified:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
That interest must be articulated along with findings specific
enough that a reviewing court
5 can determine whether the closure
order was properly entered. 1
The Court further required that trial courts consider alternatives to closure, "[e]ven with findings adequate to support closure."'
D. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court" (Press-EnterpriseII)
By the time the Court reached its fourth major access decision
in six years, it seemed ready to present a clear, defined set of rules
and standards. In Press-EntepriseII, a California trial court denied
press access to a preliminary hearing that lasted an astounding fortyone days.54 The state supreme court affirmed the closure, arguing
specifically that the First Amendment extended to events called
"trials," and not to events dubbed "pretrial hearings." The United
States Supreme Court quickly disposed of that linguistic argument:

See Press-Entuipise1, 464 U.S. at 505-08.
The Court explicitly stated that meeting the experience and logic test creates
a qualified First Amendment right just two years later in lress-Ente prise Hl, 478 U.S.
1, 9 (1986). For a slightly more in-depth discussion, see infra note 62 and accompan'ing text.
49

Prass-Enterrise , 464 U.S. at 509.
"
"2

Id. at510.

Id. at 511.
478 U.S. 1 (1986).

SSeid. at4.

Id. at 5.
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The California Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment was not implicated because the proceeding was not a criminal trial, but a preliminary hearing. However, the First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the
event, i.e., "trial" or otherwise, particularly where the preliminary
hearing functions much like a full-scale trial.w
This emphatic rejection of the notion that the holdings of
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny can be limited to one specific
type of proceeding is an important development in the evolution of
the standard. While the Court had from the beginning "eschewed
any 'narrow, literal conception' of the [First] Amendment's terms"-"
and had already extended access to voir dire," the Court in PressEnterprise II finally affirmed the applicability of the experience and
logic test to proceedings outside the criminal trial.'
Having established the test, the Court next summarized its
"considerations of experience and logic"' up through Press-Enterprise
I/.
In cases dealing with the claim of a First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings, our decisions have emphasized two
complementary considerations. First... we have considered
whether the place and process have been historically open to the
press and general public....

Second, in this setting the Court

has traditionally considered whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question."
The Court also articulated explicitly that meeting these considerations is independently sufficient to create a constitutional right of
access.62 Once this qualified right is established, it is the trial court's
task to determine if this qualified right has been outweighed by a
sufficiently "weighty" state's interest. Drawing on the Press-EnterpriseI
decision, the Court reiterated that the First Amendment interest
should prevail unless an overriding interest makes closure essential
Id. at 7.

51 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)).
oSe Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984)
[hereinafter Pra-Enterprise1].
See Press-Enteprise , 478 U.S. at 8.
, Id. at 9.
61 Id. at 8. Note the use of the phrase "criminal proceeding" in connection with

the experience and logic test. The Court's own linguistics signals a broader applicability of the test. See id.
62 "Ifthe particular proceeding in question passes these tests of experience and
logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches." Id. at 9.
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to preserve higher values, and even then the closure must be narrowly tailored to serve the interest."
E. El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico"
This latest application of the experience and logic test by the
Supreme Court, while adding little to the core of the doctrine itself,
is still important in at least two respects. First, it suggests how the
current Court might address another media access case requiring
application of the jurisprudence developed originally in Richmond
Newspapers. Second, it shows that the Court is even more committed
to the continued and expanded use of Richmond Newspapers and its
progeny.
In El Vocero, the Court examined whether the right of access extended to special pretrial hearings designed to determine whether a
defendant should stand trial.w Rule 23(c) of the Puerto Rico Rules
of Criminal Procedure specifically allowed these proceedings to be
closed unless the defendant requested otherwise.M Ignoring arguments that Puerto Rico's "unique history and traditions" justified
closure,67 the Court made quick work of the case. Finding that Rule
23 hearings, like California pretrial hearings, were "'sufficiently like a
trial' to require public access,"" the Court struck down the privacy
provision in Rule 23(c) as unconstitutional and "irreconcilable with
Press-Enterprise[1P.69
El Vocero reveals several general propositions. First, the Court
reaffirmed the applicability of the experience and logic test to proceedings outside the criminal trial itself. The Court also confirmed
its loyalty to the particular formulation of the experience and logic
test found in Press-EnterpriseII. These stances are relevant primarily
in highlighting the Court's increasing comfort with the experience
and logic test. The Court in El Vocero, however, did use an important
analytical shortcut, arguing that, because the proceeding in question
has a sufficient number of similar "features" or "commonalities" with
the proceeding in Press-EnterpriseII, the same analysis mandates access in both situations. 0 The Court's emphasis on functional equivaSeeid. at 9-10.
508 U.S. 147 (1993).
S;e id. at 148.
See P.R. LAws AN. tit. 34, App. 11 R. 23(c) (1991 & Supp. 1997).
67 See E/ Vocero, 508 U.S. at 149.
T8 Id. at 149-50.
69
& at 149.
70 See id. at 149-50.
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lence in its analysis of access cases has become increasingly prevalent

and will play an important role in this Article's discussion of media
access to juvenile proceedings."
II. ANALYSIS OF THE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERSTEST
As 'the Court displayed in El Vocero, the two-part test most recently articulated in Press-EnterpriseII has become the basic formula
in dealing with access to criminal justice proceedings. Given the
centrality of this test to the issue of granting access to juvenile proceedings," it is important to parse each facet of these tests and examine what the standards and thresholds have come to mean. First, this
section will examine each part of the experience and logic test.
Next, it will look at how the Court has weighed countervailing interests against the qualified First Amendment right that, attaches to
proceedings that pass the test. 73
A.

The Experience Test

In Richmond Newspapers, an analysis of historical evidence relating to access to the proceeding in question played a central role for
at least a majority of the Justices. 4 Indeed, Chief Justice Burger's
opinion relied almost exclusively on historical analysis. According to
the Chief Justice, "What is significant for [our] present purposes is
that throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who
cared to observe."75 Likewise, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion,
which provided the basic formula for the experience and logic test,
emphasized history.87
A closer examination of historical analysis merits breaking it
into at least two parts: history as an indication of "the favorable
judgment of experience"" and-of seemingly greater importance to
the Court-history as it relates specifically to original intent.78 The
71 See infraPart III, discussing the use of a functional analysis generally; see also
infra Part IV, applying a functional analysis to juvenile proceedings.
72 For an explanation of this author's decision to use the Richmond Newspapers
test, see infra note 288 and notes and text referred to therein.
73 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S.
1, 9 (1986) [hereinafter
Press-Enterprise11].
4See
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 559 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., joined by White and Stevens, J.J.); id. at 584 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined
by Marshall,J.).
78 Id. at 564.
78 See id. at 589-90 (Brennan,J., concurring).
78

Id. at 589 (Brennan,J., concurring).
See generally Press-Entrprise if, 478 U.S. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
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former considers the continuing evolution of the law from the time
of ratification of the Constitution-the "modem history." The latter
focuses on history as it relates to the period before and during which
our organic laws were adopted and the Constitution was ratifiedthe "colonial history. " "
Colonial history, used as a gauge of the intent of the Founding
Fathers, has played the largest role in previous applications of historical analysis. As Chief Justice Burger noted in Richmond Newspapers, "IT]he historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the
time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open."'O Later, Chief Justice
Burger again emphasized history as a measure of original intent:
"The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively open. Public access to trials was
then regarded as an important aspect of the process itself ....
.""In
the same opinion he stated, "IT]he First Amendment guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit[ed] government from
summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to
the public at the time that Amendment was adopted."8 Justice Brennan,
too, in laying out the framework for the experience and logic test,
emphasized the prevalence of open courts at the time of the adoption of our common law and the ratification of the Constitution."s
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569, 576. My discussion focuses solely on the era
during which the First Amendment was ratified, despite that both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments are central to the right of access. This is not so much an
oversight as a simple reflection of the Court's practice of focusing on the colonial
era in discussing original intent. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 604-05 (1982) (discussing the background against which the First
Amendment was drafted, making no mention of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-82 (analyzing the history of
criminal trials with an emphasis on the colonial era without mentioning ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
The Court's focus on the First Amendment, of course, does not diminish the point
that, because both amendments are central to the right, the original intent of the
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment should be taken into account as well. Given
that the first juvenile court was not established until over thirty years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, however, the notion holds that the background
against which that amendment was written, as with the First Amendment, was one
of public access to proceedings involving juveniles charged with a criminal offense.
See infraPart IV for a discussion of the history ofjuvenile courts.
79The phrases *modem history" and "colonial history" are my own terms that
describe the two phases of historical evidence the Court seems to be examining.
soRichmond Newspapers,448 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added).
81

Id. at 575.

Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
See id. at 590-91 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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That the historical test serves primarily as a test of original intent is apparent in Press-EnterpriseL In the Court's discussion of the
experience test, the entire narrative is devoted to history as it led up
to the adoption of the Constitution." It traces jury selection from its
roots in the days before the Norman Conquests, through English law
and into colonial America." Chief Justice Burger ends his discussion
of history in the late Eighteenth Century." Nowhere does the opinion suggest that considerations of subsequent developments should
play a role in determining the history of a given procedure. That
some circumstances may justify closure of the proceeding, and that
some states currently allow such closure, does not divert the Court's
historical analysis.8 Rather, such modem considerations seem to
come into play more in the discussion of the state's interest, not in
deciding whether a qualified First Amendment right attaches in giving access to a given court proceeding.
The Court attempts a more balanced look at history in PressEnterpriseII, but still relies heavily on colonial history. The Court discusses the evolution of the modem criminal justice proceeding, from
events that resembled town meetings, to cases held before "'moots,'
a collection of freemen in the community," through to its development as a public event in colonial America." Although the Court argues that open preliminary proceedings have been "the near uniform practice of state and federal courts, " " modem history indicates
a mixture of access and closure.
In giving lip service to balancing colonial-era and modern-day
history, but still relying on colonial-era history to conduct the experience test, the Court minimizes the modem history, which is far
from consistently pro-access. While noting that the "vast majority" of
states allowed access to preliminary hearings," the Court also admits
that "several states.., have allowed preliminary hearings to be closed
on the motion of the accused."9 ' The Court claims that, because preliminary proceedings in those states are "closed only for cause
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505-08 (1984)
[hereinafter Fress-Enterpise I].
SSee id.
"Publicjury selection thus was the common practice in America when the Constitution was adopted." Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
Sid. at 511 n.10.
See
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) [hereinafter PressId. at 10.
Se id. at 10 n.3.
*1 Id. at 11.
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shown," the mixed level of access sufficiently passes the historical
test.9

The Court's attempt to skirt modem history proves ultimately
unconvincing unless one accepts the analysis offered by Justice Stevens in dissent. He argues that Chief Justice Burger's attempt to
claim near-uniform access in contemporary courts falls flat "In the
final analysis, the Court's lengthy historical disquisition demon-

strates only that in many [sitates preliminary proceedings are generally
open to the Public .... In other [s]tates ...such proceedings have
been closed."" As Justice Stevens surmises, "in our prior cases history
mattered primarily for what it revealed about the intentions of the
Framers and ratifiers of the First Amendment."" The implicit message of the Court, then, is that a proceeding with a mixed modem
record that was open at the time of the Constitution's adoption is
sufficiently public in the eyes of the Court to "have been accorded
'the favorable judgment of experience.'""'
The Court's recent decision in El Vocero" offers one final lesson
regarding the experience test. In that case, the Court ignores arguments that the special "Rule 23"" preliminary proceedings have an
equally special history of closure based on "Puerto Rican tradition."""
If modem (post-1791) history were truly a consideration, then
Puerto Rico's modem tradition of closure for Rule 23 preliminary
proceedings should have been persuasive. Instead, the Court gives it
very little weight, insisting that "reliance on [that] tradition is [] mis-

Id.
Id. at 2-24 (StevensJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Pres EnterpriseH, 478 U.S. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see
also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1517 & n.6 (1995) (citing
the tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes as supporting the First
Amendment's protection for anonymous leafleting); id. at 1525, 1530 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("Thus, our analysis must focus on the practices and beliefs held by the
Founders.... While, like Justice Scalia, I am loath to overturn a century of practice
shared by almost all of the states, I believe the historical evidence from the framing
outweighs recent tradition."); id. at 1531 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("'[O]n every question of construction, [we should] carry ourselves back to the time when the Constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in the debates; and instead of
trying (to find] what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against
it, conform to the probable one in which it was passed.'") (citation omitted).
96Press-Enterprise1, 478 U.S. at 11 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982)).
El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993).
" For a discussion of and citation to Puerto Rico Rule
of Criminal Procedure
23, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
28 El Vocero, 508 U.S.
at 150.
9
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placed.""9 Rather, the experience test focuses on the history of that
"tye or kind' of proceeding "throughout the United States. " ' ®
The analysis further reflects a diminished emphasis on the
modem history of the given proceeding-that of Rule 23 pretrial
hearings. Instead, the Court continues to look at the historical analogue-the type or kind of proceeding-to establish the proceeding's "colonial" history. Finally, the Court returns to and relies on
the model of mixed history in Press-EntepriseII, stating that "[t]he
established and widespread tradition of open preliminary hearings"
was confirmed in that case.'0 ' Recall, however, that all Press-Enterprise
H established was a widespread tradition of access in colonial history
and a mixed tradition in modem times. In sum, the test looks disproportionately at history as a gauge of original intent circa 1789-91,
focusing on how courts acted around the time the Constitution and
Bill of Rights were adopted. Further, Press-EnterpriseII and El Vocero
show that the experience test can still be met if such colonial history
is pervasive, even with a mixed modem history. Finally, it is a test
that focuses on the general substance of the proceeding, rather than
its specific title or purpose.
The Logic Test

B.

The second half of the experience and logic test is concerned
with two intertwining issues. First, whether providing public access
to a given proceeding would further the First Amendment's general
aims of "protect[ing] the public and the press from abridgment of
their rights of access to information about the operation of their
government, including the Judicial Branch." °2 Second, "whether
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
"
the particular process in question. ""
While it would be easy to view an informed public as merely a
subset of a properly functioning proceeding, the Court recognizes
benefits of public access that do exist, and would exist, independent
of the aim and purpose of the process in question. For example,
among the advantages of public access listed by Chief Justice Burger
in Richmond Newspapers were the following "meta-procedural" bene9

Id.

10 Id. (citation omitted).
10 Id. at 150-51.
102Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584 (1980) (Stevens,J.,
concurring).
103 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) [hereinafter Pres-

EnLurisn17.
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fits: assuring fairness to the public, providing a check on the judicial
system, enhancing public support for the process, providing an outlet for public catharsis and concern in the wake of a violent or shocking crime, quelling vigilante instincts, decreasing fear of corruption,
and educating the public generally.'" Many of these benefits spring
not simply from furthering the aim of the process, but from allowing
the public to view the process simply for viewing's sake. Thus, if the
Court's concern is solely with the operation of the individual process, then there must be an implicit understanding that for a process
to function properly public scrutiny must be at work. As Justice
Brennan wrote in Richmond Newspapers[T]he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to
free expression and communicative interchange for their own
sakes; it has a structuralrole to play in securing and fostering our
republican system of self-government. Implicit in this structural
role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," but also the antecedent
assumption that valuable public debate-as well as other civic
behavior-must be informed. 0 5
So, even where the goal of the specific procedure in question is,
for example, locating a reasonable pool of jurors or determining the
guilt or innocence of the defendant, that procedure will function better toward its goal where the public is allowed to scrutinize the process. "Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal
trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence
in the system."'06 In other words, the Court values access both because it actually improves the functioning of the system and because
it buoys public support that allows the system to continue functioning.
C. The CountervailingState's Interest
Once the Court determines whether a qualified First Amendment right attaches, the analysis is not over.'
As Justice Brennan
explained in Richmond Newspapers, "Read with care and in context,
our decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that any
privilege of access to governmental information is subject to a degree
1e4

Se Richmond Nwspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-74.

105 Id. at 587 (Brennan,J., concurring) (citations omitted).

106Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (citing Richmond Nwspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-71) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise1].

M As the Supreme Court has stated, "[E]ven when a right of access attaches, it
is

not absolute." Press-Enteprise1I, 478 U.S. at 9.
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of restraint dictated by the nature of the information and the countervailing interests in security or confidentiality."'0° In determining
whether countervailing interests are sufficient to justify closing a
proceeding, the Court has developed standards of closure. The current standard comes from Press-EnterpriseI:
[T]he presumption may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The
interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough
that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order
was properly entered.'09

In addition, courts are to explore fully alternatives to closure
that may satisfy the state's interests.

1

Further, a court must be care-

ful to separate the impact of the proceeding with and without access,
ensuring that a state's interest in closure properly encompasses only
that additionalburden that press and public access would entail. In
discussing trials involving minor sexual assault victims, the Court
makes the point: "[T]he measure of the State's interest lies not in

the extent to which minor victims are injured by testifying, but rather
in the incremental injury suffered by testifying in the presence of the
press and the generalpublic.""'
To justify closure of a criminal justice proceeding once a qualified First Amendment right has been established, the trial court
must satisfy six criteria: (1) an overriding state's interest, (2) closure
must be essential to preserve higher values, (3) any closure order
must be narrowly tailored, (4) analysis and facts supporting closure
must be sufficiently articulated for review, (5) there exist no alternatives that preserve the interest, and (6) the incremental impact on
the interest alone must satisfy the above criteria. This stringent
standard mandates a high burden on the party seeking closure and is
intended to be very difficult to meet. "Closed proceedings, although
not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that
2
outweighs the value of openness."1

III. DEMANDING A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS APPROACH
The test set out in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny addresses difficult constitutional questions. The issues surrounding
08 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Pras-Enerpre I, 478 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Press-Enterprim , 464 U.S. at 510).

109

1o Sm id. at 14.

I
112

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 n.19 (1982).
Pres-Enerpise 1,464 U.S. at 509.
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such controversies reach deep into basic issues in our society and in
our democracy. Such constitutional analysis, then, must be conducted on a level beyond mere labels and rhetoric. In determining
whether Richmond Newspapers should extend to juvenile proceedings,
or any other proceedings, it is vital that we look behind the curtain,
so to speak, and find out what is really going on in the proceeding in
question. Because of the special importance of constitutional conflicts, the Court has recognized that the analysis must be performed
not on a superficial level, but on a functional one."" It is thus imanalysis
that courts
perative for a true constitutional
"eschew... label [s]-of-convenience""4 and examine the facts contextually.

Particularly in the arena of the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court has insisted on a functional approach. After all, our right to
free speech, press, and assembly allows us to exercise effectively a
check on those empowered to run our government-"an essential
component in our structure of self-government." 5 Recently, in Colorado Republican Campaign Committee v. EC, the Court addressed the
issue of labeling in a case involving campaign contributions by political parties" The government had attempted to deem all campaign
donations from a political party to a candidate "coordinated contributions," which can be constitutionally constrained."7 The Republican Party, on the other hand, argued that the funds were
"independent expenditures," donations the Court had previously
held to be a more direct political expression by the donor that could
not be limited by law."" Thus, the First Amendment protection
sought by the party hinged on what label was given to the donations.
The Federal Elections Committee argued that all donations from
parties were contributions and not expenditures, stating that
"coordination with candidates is presumed.""9 The Court rejected

13Se In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
1:

Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (citation omitted).

IS Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.

The full comment reads:

"And in the

broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in
and serve as a check upon the judicial process--an essential component in our
structure of self-government." Id.

16 See generally Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309
(1996).
: See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
,a See id. at 23-38.
119

ColoradoRepublican, 116 S. Ct. at 2318 (citation omitted).
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this characterization, made "without any internal or external evidence":'20
[W]e recognize that the FEC may have characterized the expenditures as "coordinated" in light of this Court's constitutional decisions prohibiting regulation of most independent expenditures.
But, if so, the characterizationcannot help the Government prove
its case. An agency's simply calling an independent expenditure a
'coordinated expenditure" cannot (for constitutional purposes) make it
one.

121

The Court cited NAACP v. Button for the proposition that "the
government 'cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by
mere labels, ' " 22 and Edwards v. South Carolina as holding that a
"[s]tate may not avoid [the] First Amendment's strictures by applying the label 'breach of peace' to peaceful demonstrations. " '2 In
conducting an analysis of a case with constitutional, and particularly
First Amendment, ramifications, the Court demanded a deeper examination beyond how parties characterize key components of the
case. This requires asking how something actually works or what is
actually going on, rather than accepting the assumptions made implicitly by traditional labels.
When the Supreme Court relies on an examination of historical
evidence in determining a constitutional issue, as in the Richmond
Newspapers experience test, it prefers of course to compare identical
procedures.'2 4 Often, however, there is no identical procedure to
which the Court can compare a modem procedure, which is the case
with juvenile proceedings, having only been "invented" at the turn of
this century.'2 In such circumstances, the Court must, and does,
look for close analogies in history to conduct comparative analyses.
The Court has developed this procedure in a line of decisions relating to the availability of a jury trial in various causes of action based
on the Seventh Amendment.'2 6 In Seventh Amendment cases, just as
120

Id.
Id. at 2319 (emphasis added).
In Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)).
1
Id. (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235-38 (1963)).
121

124 The Court has been able to examine identical parallels (for example, Richmond Newspapers) with regard to criminal trials. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Vi r9nia, 448 U.S. 555, 565-69 (1980) (plurality opinion).
See infra note 146 and accompanying text, noting that the first juvenile court
was established in 1899.
I" See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996)
(patent infringement action should be tried to a jury because it is analogous to a
legal cause of action); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (defendant entitled to ajury trial where government sought civil penalties and inductive relief be-
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in Richmond Newspapers, the Court uses an "historical test."" The
Court looks first for an identical cause of action, but failing that will
locate a cause of action that is analogous.'28 This is particularly important in classifying a modem practice that may draw from several
sources to create a "mongrel practice."'" "Where there is no exact
antecedent, the best hope lies in comparing the modem practice to
earlier ones whose allocation to court or jury we do know, seeking
the best analogy we can draw between [the] old and the new.""
Such a comparison requires, again, a functional analysis-one that
looks at the "substance" of the rights or causes of action or proceedings, to find the closest analogy possible. As with Colorado Republican5 ' and Button,"2 the Court will not stop its analysis simply because
it must go beyond labels into substance, essence, or analogy.
A functional analysis of the access issue requires courts to look
carefully at each of the relevant tests. The experience analysis
should not focus on how other proceedings with similar labels have
been treated historically, but should instead examine proceedings in
which similar events occur and similar purposes are served. Likewise,
the logic test should not look at the procedural and societal benefit
of access to similarly named proceedings, but should look at proceedings that transpirein a fashion similar to the one at issue. Finally, and
most importantly, when determining the strength of the state's interest, a court should not accept as a forgone conclusion that the interests suggested by the state are either valid or well served. "When
the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means
to... prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply posit
the existence of the disease sought to be cured."'" To outweigh a
qualified First Amendment right, then, a denial of access must be
based on more than a mere claim of harms. Such claims must be
carefully examined and substantiated to test their validity.

cause cause of action was more analogous to suits traditionally tried before a jury);
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (either party entitled to a jury in an action
for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, because the cause of action was
analogous to an ordinary action for damages).

Markman, 116 S. CL at 1389 (quoting Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendvent, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 640-43 (1973)).
128 See Tu44 481 U.S. at 420.
129Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1390.
Id. (citations omitted).
131Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
13

NAACPv. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Colrado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2317 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
'
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When addressing constitutional issues, the Court has endorsed
a functional analysis of both criminal justice proceedings generally
and juvenile proceedings specifically, demanding discussion be built
on analysis "sturdier than mere verbiage, [with] reasons more persuasive than clich6 can provide."'" In other words, the Court must
be satisfied that the facts actually merit the rhetoric. "[I]t is clear
under [Supreme Court] cases that determining the relevance of constitutional policies, like determining the applicability of constitutional rights, in juvenile proceedings, requires that courts eschew
'the 'civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile
proceedings,' and that 'the juvenile process... be candidly appraised.'"'"
Part V uses the kind of functional analysis suggested by the
Court in the cases discussed in this section as a framework with
which to examine the modern juvenile justice system.
IV. A FUNCTIONAL LOOKATJUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
A functional analysis of juvenile proceedings requires pushing
past characterizations to ask what is occurring to the individual juveniles in the system. Throughout the course of American history, the
way the criminal justice system has viewed juveniles has changed."
From a functional point of view, however, the only question before
and after these changes can be stated simply- how do they alter the
way juveniles are being treated? A good metaphor might be a timetraveling fourteen-year-old with a bad habit of committing burglaries.
How would such a youth have been treated two hundred and fifty
years ago, fifty years ago, twenty years ago, and today? Only if the answers change can it be said that the juvenile system is functionally
different. If the answers do not change, then the juvenile justice system becomes the functional equivalent of the criminal justice system
with a juvenile defendant. If that is the case, then from a constitutional perspective, the doctrine that applies to criminal proceedings
must apply to juvenile proceedings as well. Although juvenile procedures may contain some unique elements, if they are substantially
analogous to criminal proceedings then again the same rules and
protections surely must apply. 7 This is not to say that juvenile proIn re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1967).
Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (citations omitted).
1W See genera/iy ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHD SAvEas: THE INvENTON OF DE,
13

135

LiNQtENCy (2d ed. 1977) (providing a general history of the juvenile justice system).

For further discussion of this issue, see supra notes 126-29 and accompanying

text.
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ceedings should become adult criminal trials or be abolished altogether. With the access issue, for example, juvenile justice has been
and continues to be carried out underpublic scrutiny in many jurisdictions without destroying the courts.' But in the access context, it
takes more than a benevolent label to justify ignoring Supreme
Court precedent. It takes contrasts on the deepest levels.
A.

The History and Underpinningof theJuvenileJustice System

Historically speaking, the entire notion of a separate justice system for juvenile defendants is a relatively new development. For
centuries, before and after the colonization of America, children
charged with a criminal act were treated no differendy from adults
accused of the same crime."9 At the time when our organic laws
were adopted and the Constitution was ratified, any juvenile accused
of committing a crime was tried as any other person would be: in a
criminal court."
The child was arrested; placed in prison; indicted by the grand
jury;, tried by a petit jury-under all the forms and technicalities of
our criminal law-with the aim of ascertaining whether it had done
the specific act (and nothing else); and if it had, then of visiting the
punishment of the state upon it."'
Given that criminal trials were open to the public,"2 any trial of
a juvenile would have been freely attended by the public. If convicted, the child would have been sentenced to a term of incarceration in an adult facility, again with the single criminal justice system.
It was, in fact, this system of parallel punishment not parallel adjudication, that was the real driving force behind nineteenth-century
reformers."' Efforts to create reformatories and other less-punitive
138 See infra notes 308-311 and accompanying text, noting that many states currently allow the public and press access in some or all juvenile proceedings.
See HERBERT H. Lou, JuvENuz CouR-rs IN ae Uni ED STATES 13-14 (1927).

Lou details the hanging of children as young as eight during the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. See id. at 13. Although historians are unclear
exactly how young a defendant could be, Julian Mack has stated that a child over
the age of criminal responsibility, "seven at common law and in some of our states,
ten in others," was treated no differently than any other criminal defendant. See
Julian W. Mack, TheJuvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. Rzv. 104, 106 (1909). Presumably a
child under the age of criminal responsibility was deemed not to have the requisite
mewu rea to commit a criminal act.

40 See Mack, supra note 139, at
106.
1' See id.
14 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,

(plurality opinion).

564 (1980)

13 "Ihe idea that the reform movement leading to the 1899 Act
was aimed at
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methods of incarceration began in the 1820s'" and ran off and on
throughout the nineteenth century. Again, during this time, reformers allowed children to continue being tried in adult criminal
courts." It was not until 1899 that Illinois established the first separate juvenile court.'" After Illinois, other states followed suit, and by
1925, all but two states had passed some type of juvenile court legislation. 47
Juvenile justice reformers were motivated by profoundly philanthropic motives. It was their intent to eliminate completely the notion of punishment for juvenile offenders, replacing it with reform
and rehabilitation. "' Discussing the District of Columbia's juvenile
justice system in Kent v. United States,'49 the Supreme Court summed
up the theoretical underpinnings that drove the founding ofjuvenile
courts:
The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like that of other
jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in
the corpusjuris. Its proceedings are designated as civil rather than

criminal. The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures
of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for
society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.1
To accomplish the goals of this new nonpunitive system, reformers envisioned a trade-off of sorts: the rights normally granted
to a criminal defendant, seen as rigidities of criminal procedure that
only impeded the interests of the child, were to be taken away in exchange for a system where the state would offer a guiding hand, not
substituting an informal judicial process for criminal trials has no basis in historical
fact.... [C]hild welfare advocates wanted a better place for the child to live when he
was in state custody." Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective,
22 STAN. L. Rxv. 1187, 1220-21 (1970) (emphasis added); see also Lou, supra note
139, at 15-16 ("The attention of reformers was at first directed not to the modification of court procedure and the prevention of the conviction of the child for an offense but to the idea that after conviction he should be kept in confinement apart
from adult criminals.").
1" SeeFox, supranote 143, at 1189-90.
SSee Lou, supra note 139,
at 19.
46 SeeFox, supranote
143, at 1222.
1
See Gilbert Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings,30 RocKY MTN. L. REv.
101, 105 (1958).
14
See, e.g., Mack, supra note 139, at 107 ("[T]he child who has begun to go
wrong, who is incorrigible, who has broken a law or an ordinance, is to be taken in
hand by the state, not as an enemy but as a protector, as the ultimate guardian.").
149

383 U.S. 541 (1966).

IO Id. at 554.
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serve as a punitive enforcer. "The substitution of enlightened paternalism for the procedural and sentencing rigidities of criminal procedure is basic to the juvenile court system."' From the beginning,
then, diminished protection from the state was exchanged for
heightened protection by the state. True,juveniles defending against
criminal charges lost the procedural safeguards afforded adults
charged with the same crimes,' but reformers promised they would
in return be dealt with more as lost souls than as societal miscreants.
"The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child
was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather
than punitive. " "'
Reformers envisioned a new system that would be different from
the adult system on every level, from the juvenile's entry into custody, through adjudication, to the time the child was released.
Youths would not be arrested and put into the criminal justice system; rather, they would be sent to a juvenile judge.'" Once there,
the fatherly jurist would put an arm around the youth'" and talk with
him "as a wise and merciful father handles his own child,"'" discussing making things better rather than determining guilt.'57 Children
who committed criminal acts would not be deemed guilty, but only
in need of reform. That reform was to come in an utterly nonpunitive environment that would in no way resemble ajail or other incar151

Geis, supra note 147, at 101.

152

See id. at 123 (observing that "Uluvenile courts eliminated constitutional

guarantees to an almost unlimited extent").

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
This theme of establishing a separate lexicon for the juvenile justice system
was widespread. In fact, the juvenile justice system specialized in euphemisms. As
one early reformer explained,
[Tlhe proceedings are divested of all the features which attach to a

criminal proceeding. Instead of a "complaint" or "indictment," there
is a "petition." Instead of a "warrant" there is a "summons." The child
is not "arrested" but is brought in by the parent or guardian or by a

probation officer.
T.D. HuRLw, JuvEm.m CouRTS AND WHAT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED 76 (1904).
Children were also not to be placed injail but in "a 'detention home' or other suit-

able place outside of the jail." Id.
15

Such language is not mere hyperbole.

One early juvenile court judge de-

scribed his goals with ajuvenile defendant: "[I]f I could get close enough to him to
put my hand on his head or shoulder, or my arm around him, in nearly every such
case I could get his confidence."

RoBErr M. MENNEL, THORNS AND THISnlZS:

1825-1940, at 135 (1973) (quoting
George W. Stubbs, ajuvenile courtjudge in Indianapolis).
Mack, supranote 139, at 107.
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See id.
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ceration.'" Reformers saw a foster home as the preferred placement
option and thought the juvenile justice system could place most delinquents in such settings."" Those few who could not be placed with
individual foster parents were to be sent to group homes where, in
units of no more than four, these lost angels would learn skills and
morals, preferably in a country setting:"
What is needed is a large area, preferably in the country[]because these children require the fresh air and contact with the
soil even more than does the normal child[]-aid out on the
cottage plan, giving opportunity for family life, and in each cottage some good man and woman who will live with and for the
children. Locks and bars and other indicia of prisons must be
avoided; human love, supglemented by human interest and vigilance, must replace them.
Such a system was to wash the juvenile clean of his or her bad
tendencies and create good citizens and productive adults, "fitted to
do a man's or woman's work in the world." 62 Reformers saw the juvenile court as a modern-day panacea that "reache[d] right down
into the heart of evil and promise[d] to tear out, in time, the roots
which cause the growth of bad citizenship."'"
To embark on this program of rehabilitation-driven reform,
states needed a rationale to justify this planned, benevolent deprivadon ofjuvenile defendants' rights. The "theoretical justification for
subjecting predelinquent children to a coercive court commitment"'" came in the form of parens patriae, a doctrine that allowed
government to circumvent formal protections based on the state's
right to step in and serve as the "parent" of children whose own parents would not or could not provide sufficient guidance.'6 The state
IM See, e.g., HuRLEY, supranote 154, at 11-12 ("[Tlhe entire thought of those who
framed the [juvenile court] law was to banish all idea of crime and punishment and
to overcome entirely the positive evil of ajail commitment and a formal trial .
").
9 The system's reliance on foster homes and a
home-like setting is evident even
in the statutory intent laid out in Illinois's first-in-the-nation Juvenile Court Act,
which gave as its purpose "[tlhat the care, custody, and disciple of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents, and in all
cases where it can properly be done the child be placed in an improved family
home and become a member of the family by legal adoption or otherwise." Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of Apr. 21, 1889, § 16, 1899 Ill. Laws 136-37.
160 See Mack, supra note 139, at 114.
161

162
1
MA

Id.
Id.

HutLY, supranote 154, at 29.

Fox, supranote 143, at 1192.

1W See BLACK's LAw DiCnoNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (defining paens patriae as

"the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves,
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reasoned that, because children would benefit from an informal,
nonpunitive forum and because legal protection of children was not
equal,'" diminished procedural protections would be both warranted
by the promises of reform and justified by its role as parens patriae.
In short, juvenile justice reform began out of concern for children's treatment while incarcerated and only at the turn of the century began to consider how children were treated by the courts.
Latching on to a justification for diminished procedural protection
through parens patriae reformers embarked on a self-described
"epoch-making movement." 6 ' Pledged to rehabilitation and naively
altruistic,'" this new movement set out to create an entirely new system, from one end to the other, unlike anything the criminal justice
system had ever produced.
B. A CloserExamination of theJuvenile System's Foundationsand
Rationale

While there can be no doubt that the juvenile justice reforms of
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries intended to achieve
stunning results,'6 almost from the beginning critics and supporters
alike began to realize that the juvenile court system was failing to
make good on any of its lofty promises.'
The system was understaffed and underfunded,' the judges were underqualified,'" and if
such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents").
'1 For a description of this principle, see infra note 184 and accompanying text.
See also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("[luveniles, unlike adults, are
always in some form of custody .... ."); Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's
Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982) (same).
167 Lou, supranote 139, at 19.
168 This fact is evident by the very language used by reformers to describe the juvenile justice system they envisioned. See supra notes 154-158 and accompanying
text; see also infra note 169.
169 See HuRLEY, supra note 154, at 7-8. Hurley's enthusiasm is sadly misplaced.
"Potentially, the Juvenile Court law, as adopted by the Legislature of the State of Illinois, provides the solution of the entire economic problem-the problem of ignorance, poverty, and crime.... It appears to the enthusiast to be the very ultima
thule of legislation, .. . bringing about in time a millennial condition .... " Id.
10 See generally ELLEN RYERSON, THE BESr-LAm PLANS: AMERiCA'S JuvENIL Couirr
EXPmuENT 137-62 (1978) (discussing the history of the disillusionment felt by reformers and others with the juvenile justice system as it came into being).
See Fox, supra note 143, at 1224.
The juvenile court generally ranks low in state judiciary hierarchy; this-along
with a lack of resources--keeps many qualified judges away. See Stephen Jonas, Press
Access to theJuvenile Courtroom: Juvenile Anonymity and the FirstAmendmen 17 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 287, 310-11 (1982). As late as 1971,juvenile judges were often
incompetent to perform the tasks of the attorneys appearing before them. The Supreme Court observed, "A recent study of juvenile court judges... revealed that
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children were sent to a separate facility at all, it was often "heavily
punitive and functioned much like the adult prisons.""" It was distinguishable only in that none of the inmates had reached majority-a far cry from the country cottages promised by reformers." 4
Even Judge Benjamin Lindsey, a lion of the juvenile justice movement,"5 and Julia Lathrop, another forceful advocate, expressed
their concern that the system they envisioned had not materialized."76
During these first decades, supporters acknowledged that the juvenile court "had not succeeded in providing the services it had promised,"'" but responded by pushing for further reforms, leading one
former advocate of reform to ask, "Are we not ourselves, in this delinquency business, something of fanatics? 'Fanatics are those who
redouble their efforts-when they have forgotten their aim. ' " "7 Despite a continued "fanaticism" of one type or another since then, today's juvenile proceedings remain a far cry from their intended condition and are only likely to get worse in the future."9
Why the juvenile justice system never created the panacea promised by the "massive propaganda campaign" surrounding it's remains
an interesting historical question. The most obvious possible reason
is that the juvenile court system was largely never more than a rhetorical concept, unendowed with any real infrastructural or logistical
support.18' As one historian put it, "juvenile courts ... provided new
bottles for old wine."" Even more succinctly, "the juvenile court law
changed nothing of substance."' Still, there have of course been

half had not received undergraduate degrees; a fifth had received no college education at all; a fifth were not members of the bar." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 544 n.4.
" Fox, supra note 143, at 1234.
174

Compare supranotes 160-61 and accompanying text for some of the language

used by reformers; see also PLAr, supra note 136, at 61-66 (outlining the cottage

plan).
175See

RYERSON,

supra note 170, at 30 (calling Lindsay "one of the most influen-

tial leaders of the juvenile court movement").
176 See id. at

138.

"7

Id.

178

Id. at 139 (quoting Mariam Van Waters, The DelinquentAttitude-A Study ofJu-

venie Delinquentsfrom the Standpoint of Human Relationships, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SOCIAL WORK 165 (1924)).
179 See infranotes 277-80 and accompanying text, discussing the shortcomings of

today's juvenile justice system.
lei See Fox, supra note 143, at 1230.
1
See id. at 1224.

In

MENNEL,

supra note 155, at 132.

181 Fox, supranote 143, at 1230.
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some juvenile courts and detention facilities built since that time.
The problem, then, must go deeper.
Another possible reason lies in the questionable premise upon
which the system was-and is-built. The constitutional basis was
parens patriae and the sociological basis was rehabilitation. As discussed above, parens patriaeprovided the "cornerstone justification"'"
forjuvenile justice reforms, including the juvenile courts movement.
The Supreme Court examined more closely the parens patriaerationale in In re Gault "The Latin phrase [parenspatriae] proved to be a
great help to those who rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from
the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic
credentials are of dubious relevance."'6
This slightly pointed explanation of the doctrine exposes a
deeper and too often overlooked element of the rationale used to
justify the modern juvenile justice system. Juveniles gave up a lot
when they were thrust into the modern juvenile system. Before the
reforms of the early-twentieth century, "the state was not deemed to
have authority to accord Uuveniles] fewer procedural rights than
adults."1" Courts felt compelled to offer the same type of protections
given to adults for the same reasons they were given to adults, and
courts felt they lacked the power to do otherwise. Thus, children
were indeed "treated as adults with all the formalities of the criminal
law and constitutional safeguards. " '8 These safeguards were necessary because of the threat the state made on the defendant's liberty.
Reformers offered a new system in which the state would no longer
pose a threat to the defendant, but instead would serve as a protector. This system would remove the threat of a punitive judiciary;
thus, the safeguards previously required were deemed "altogether
inapplicable."" This authority to grant fewer rights, again, was discovered by reformers in the parens patriaedoctrine. As the Court explains in Gault parenspatriaeis not without is sacrifices:
The right of the state, as parenspatriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty but to
custody." He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to
school, etc. If his parents default in effectively performing their
custodial functions-that is, if the child is "delinquent"-the state
18

Id. at 1193.

InreGault,387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
I8
18 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
18 Lou, supra note 139, at 19.
l
atdt, 387 U.S. at 15 (citing Mack, supranote 139, at 119-20).
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may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any
rights, because he has none. It merely provides the "custody" to
which the child is entitled. On this basis, proceedings involving
juveniles were described as "civil" not "criminal" and therefore
not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it
seeks to deprive a person of his liberty.' "
Such a system risks all the child's rights in the hope of saving
the child. It is no wonder that Dean Roscoe Pound commented, as
quoted by the Gault Court, that "'[t]he powers of the Star Chamber
were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts .... ,,"
This notion of a child without rights or liberties, however, does not
mesh with the Court's own proclamations on the rights of juveniles. 1T ' For example, the Court has stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."'9 Certainly these rights were of a lesser degree than those afforded
adults."1 Even assuming, however, the state had the option to provide reduced procedural protection to juvenile defendants because
of their status as minors, that option was valid only as long as parens
patriae provided a reasonable substitute to ensure just outcomes.
Neither parens patriae nor any other doctrine could support the
elimination of basic fairness and due process 9 in any criminal justice
proceeding, juvenile or otherwise. "Under our Constitution, the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."'" Yet it
was precisely that kind of arbitrariness that forced the Supreme
Court to give the system, and parens patriae, another look.'" Given
T

19 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
190 Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
1 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55, 563 (1966).

In fact, the Court
has recognized the rights of minors in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Minors, as well as adults,
areprotected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.").
I Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
9
See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 266 (1984) (children are always subject to parental control and thus have diminished rights).
194 Se Kent, 383 U.S.
at 553.
1
Gault, 387 U.S. at 28.
19 See, e.g., Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56. In Kent, the Court questioned
whether the
juvenile court has the ability to live up to its parenspatriae obligations. The Court
correctly voiced its concern that the infrastructure of the juvenile court system was
simply insufficient to meet the significant responsibility thrust upon it-that of serving as the juvenile's parens patria& "There is much evidence that some juvenile
courts, including that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities and
techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the [s] tate in a parens paviae
capacity, at least with respect to children charged with law violation." Id.
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the diminished credibility of the parens patriae doctrine'o the juvenile justice system soon became an elaborately constructed framework, sui generis in its design and purpose, if not its function, with a
rapidly disintegrating foundation.
Other possible reasons for the failure of the juvenile justice
model are systemic. SanfordJ. Fox argues that the system was fueled
by a naively simplistic theory that a "predictive relationship" existed
between poverty and delinquency-that poverty was linked to immorality, immorality to crime, and therefore poverty itself was seen as
the cause of criminal instincts in children.' Once this view was discredited,'" the notion that juvenile delinquents were somehow not
responsible for their acts also collapsed, and so went the underlying
justification for a nonadjudicatory, nonpunitive juvenile system.2
n See RYERSON, supra note 170, at 148-50 (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal
to allow the parenspatr/aedoctrine to justify denial of due process to juvenile defendants). Although it is true that parens patriae is not completely discredited as a
proper motivation for the state, see Seha/L 467 U.S. at 265-66 (reaffirming that the
state has parens patriae power to intervene where parents fail to control their children), it simply lacks the kind of talismanic power it was granted in the early years
of the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 (1905)
(holding that the parenspatriae power justified deprivation of due process rights to
the juvenile in light of the state's noble aim). The constitutionality of decisions like
Fsherwas found with relative ease at the turn of the century, in large part based on
theower of parenspatriae See Lou, supra note 139, at 9-12.
See Fox, supra note 143, at 1233. Fox puts the demise of the "predictive relationship" theory around the time of the Great Depression, "when impersonal economic forces reduced to poverty great numbers of Americans whose moral credentials were not open to question." Id. (citations omitted).
199 The notion that juvenile courts can in any way reliably predict future delinquency remains thoroughly discredited today. See, e.g., Edward J. McLaughlin &
Lucia Beadel Whisenand, Jury Tria4 Public Trial and Free Press in Juvenile Proceedings:
An Analysis and Comparison of the IJA/ABA, Task Force and NAC Standards,46 BROOK
L. REv. 1, 16 (1979); David A. Geller, Note, Putting the "Parens"Back into ParensPatriae: ParentalCustody ofJuveniles as an Alternative to PretrialJuvenileDetention, 21 NEW
ENG.J. ON CRM. & CIv. CONFINEMENr 509, 519-21 (1995).
2W See Fox, supra note 143, at 1233-35. An interesting historical
residue of the
rise and fall of the notion that alljuveniles were not culpable has been the impact
on children generally below ten years of age. At common law, these children were
seen as too young to have the requisite criminal culpability to commit a crime. See
Mack, supranote 139, at 106. While many states have a minimum age for juvenile
court jurisdiction, ranging from six to twelve years of age, see HOwARD N. SNmYER &
MEUSSA SIcamuNn,JuvE m.E OFrmxN ams AND ViCrims: A NATIONAL REPORT 73 (1995),
in many states these children were, and are, made subject to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court largely because it was intended to be non-criminal. Ironically, as the
juvenile justice system has become increasingly punitive, these very young children
have had to face a harsher fate than would have befallen them centuries ago, before
the supposedly benevolent reforms of the early twentieth century.
One unofficial analog to the idea that younger children lack culpability may be
the use of informal rather than formal juvenile proceedings for younger offenders.
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Another systemic failure cuts even deeper into the viability of the
concept of a juvenile court: some have charged that there existed a
"disabling incongruity between the judicial and therapeutic functions. " 201 Perhaps seeking to build a nonadversarial, rehabilitative institution around an adversarial, adjudicatory body was doomed from
the start.' Whether or not it is theoretically possible to conduct a
nonadjudicatory adjudication, it has not been achieved in juvenile
courts. In juvenile adjudications, it became clear that the judge was
deciding criminal culpability.f'
One clear structural reason juvenile courts have failed to live up
to their promises of rehabilitation is that the courts themselves were
never intended to be the nexus of reformation of delinquents.
Rather, courts were to serve as a gateway to new rehabilitative institutions. Fox argues that "consistent evidence from the most relevant
sources" indicates that the heart of the reform movement was aimed
at changing institutional conditions, not changing the procedure
used to channel juveniles into those institutions.M Even more than
with attempts to reform adjudication, however, efforts and legislation
to change institutions were, by all accounts, "a colossal failure."20
Turn-of-the-century legislation practiced "financial starvation"' on
juvenile reform legislation, and as a result, conditions remained
stagnant. Children continued to be thrown into adult prisons and
M
changed.juvenile
Juvenilesfacilities2
were either
Twenty
years
later, little
jails.
or
punitive
and had
overcrowded
placed in
highly
Informal proceedings involve the defendant agreeing to voluntary sanctions in exchange for avoiding a formal adjudication. See id. at 131. Nearly half of all delinquency cases are handled in this informal manner, with younger defendants receivinghe informal treatment more often. See id. (citation omitted).
RYERSON, supranote 170, at 139.
One commentator and veteran juvenile defense attorney explains: "Ajudicial
system, juvenile, criminal, or civil, is meant to resolve disputes... and to punish
those individuals who somehow upset society's balance. Trying to make a court become a rehabilitative social instrument has been a noble experiment, but nevertheless a failure." PATRIcKT. MuRPHY, OUR KINDLYPARENT-THE STATE 171 (1974).
s See Fox, supra note 143, at 1235. Fox quotes a particularly clear critique from
a California appeals court judge, who observed, "'While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed a
conviction of crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes this is a legal fiction,
presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason.'" Id. (quoting In
re Contreras,
241 P.2d 631, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)).
MoId. at 1224.
205 Id.
2"

Id.

208

Sm PLAIr, supra note 136, at 146.
One account of life at the St. Charles School for Boys in the late 1920s re-

counted punishment for infractions by the leather strap or worse. See id. at 150.
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regular jails and prisons because many states had not actually established independent juvenile facilities.2 These problems persisted
into the 1950s. Describing juvenile detention facilities, Albert
Deutsch observed the hypocrisy of the rhetoric. "Catch-words of the
trade-'individualization of treatment,' 'rehabilitating the maladjusted'-rolled easily off the tongues of many institutional officials
who not only didn't put these principles into practice but didn't
even understand the meaning." 2
This problem has only become
forty years ago.2
over
observations
Deutsch's
since
worse
The Supreme Court's juvenile due process decisions firmly establish that confinement to a modern juvenile detention facility-by
whatever name--constitutes incarceration.
Facilities remain hope1
lessly overcrowded2 " and the staff are overworked and underpaid."
What is more, in spite of one-hundred years of rhetoric, juveniles are
either placed in "jail-like" detention homes or jail itself.21 5 Thus, the
single most important goal of the reforms that established the juvenile justice system-to change the institutions in which delinquent
children were held 21'-has failed completely. This failure to reform
these institutions is particularly damning to the original cause of rehabilitation. It is in these facilities that children were to receive the
moral training that would enable them to return to society and become productive adults.2" Without facilities in which to conduct rehabilitation, there was simply no teeth to the nonpunitive vision of
juvenile justice.

"Some boys were punished by being locked up in the 'hole' for up to thirty-two days

with no shoes and no mattress. They slept on wooden boards nailed to the concrete
floor. Some were handcuffed to iron pipes and kept manacled day and night." Id.
(citation omitted).
9SMENNEL, supranote 155, at 146.
210 Fox, supra note 143, at 1233 (quoting ALBERT DEurscH, OuR REJEcTED
CHunI

15 (1950)).

The Department ofJustice notes that the 26% increase in the volume of cases

2

passing through an already overwhelmed juvenile justice system, coupled with a
disproportionate increase in cases involving violent crime, has "placed a strain on
the system." SNYDER & SICmUND, supranote 200, at 126.
For a discussion of this principle, see infra notes 241-45 and accompanying
text.

' See SOL RuBiN, LAw OF JLuEIiLE JusTicE 17 (1976) (noting that detention
homes, when built at all, are immediately close to full or overcrowded).
215

SeePLATr, supranote 136, at 152.
See RuBIN, supra note 213, at 16-18.

16

See Fox, supra note 143, at 1222-24.

14

See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text, elaborating on the idealized
facilities that were to serve as the heart of the new system.
217
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The Supreme Court's string of decisions considering (and all
but one mandating) the re-installation of procedural safeguards for
juvenile defendants provides a good account of the realization that
the juvenile justice experiment had largely failed, leaving juveniles in
a perilous limbo. Starting in 1966, with Kent v. United States, the
Court began a systematic re-examination of juvenile proceedings,
with disturbing findings. "There is evidence, in fact, that there may
be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for chil2 18
dren."
The basic fear that drove the Court was that the underpinnings
of the system, rehabilitation as justified by parenspatriae, were simply
failing to provide the promised results, often leaving juvenile defendants worse off than if they had been tried in a criminal court.21 9
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious
questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough
against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the
process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to
adults.2
In the years that followed Kent, the Court again and again answered these most serious questions regarding juvenile proceedings
in the negative, further suggesting that the experiment of trading
rights for rehabilitation had resulted only in the former without fulfilling the promises of the latter. As the Court explained, promises
of compassion and benevolence "[have] not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened
procedure, but in arbitrariness."221
Particularly disturbing to the Supreme Court was that the rights
of the juvenile had clearly been eliminated, yet the promised pay-off
of a more individualistic and rehabilitative system had not appeared.
After listing several possible rights violations that allegedly occurred
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
One famous example of this is the outcome in In re Gault, where the defendant, Gerald Francis Gault, was placed in custody for six years for committing an
offense with a maximum six-month sentence for adult offenders. As one commentator noted, "This was parenspatriae turned on its philosophical head." Jonas, supra
note 172, at 303.
no See Kent, 383 U.S. at 555.
221 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967).
218
2
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in Gault (unlawful detention, interrogation outside the presence of
counsel or a guardian, failure to notify the juvenile's parents, deprivation of liberty without finding of probable cause, no warning regarding a right to counsel, no warning of a right to remain silent,
and the illegal taking and use of fingerprints), the Court expressed
these concerns:
These contentions raise problems of substantial concern as to the
construction of and compliance with the Juvenile Court Act.
They also suggest basic issues as to the justifiability of affording a
juvenile less protection than is accorded to adults suspected of
criminal offenses, particularly where, as here, there is an absence
of any indication that the denial of rights available to adults was
offset, mitigated, or explained by action of the Government, as
parens patriae, evidencing the special solicitude for juveniles
commanded by the Juvenile Court Act.2n
Put another way, even if the idea behind the reformer's model
was justifiable, thatjustification becomes moot when the system does
not live up to its own promises. What the Court saw, and what we
continue to see today, is a system (1) based on a constitutional tradeoff, (2) grounded in a shaky doctrine, (3) that pursues a laudable
but thus-far illusory goal, and (4) that has-not surprisingly--failed
to meet its own expectations. Instead, the current juvenile justice
system is short on funds, vision, public support, and justifiability. As
Mark Harrison Moore remarked in the introduction to his examination of the juvenile justice system, "What began as a promising social
experiment has disappointed nearly everyone."",
C. Juvenile Proceedings Today: A ComparativeAnalysis with Adult
Trials
Juvenile proceedings were, from their inception, intended to
provide an alternative to the criminal justice system, where different
goals and different values would create a wholly separate paradigm.
With those goals unattained and those values under fire, however, of
what does the modern juvenile justice system actually consist? It
seems logical to examine the system juvenile courts were intended to
replace to determine if in fact the juvenile court of today is truly anything more than the criminal court of the underaged. The analysis
is made with an eye toward the ultimate question: if the two systems
are sufficiently alike, should not the constitutional safeguards for

M

u

Kent, 383 U.S. at 551-52.

MAR HARRISON MOORE, Freface to 1 FROM CHLDREN TO CmzENs

vii (1987).
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both the defendant and the community in each system be commensurate?
In its cases since Richmond Newspapers,'m the Court has gone
about the task of extending rights beyond criminal trials largely by
performing a functional analysis of the proceeding in question. The
Court will ask if a given proceeding is "sufficiently like a trial,"2 requiring an examination of what goes on during the proceeding, not
what the proceeding is called. This entails examining the components of the proceeding and determining if those same components
can be found in a proceeding already deemed open to the public.m
Press-EnterpriseH enumerated the elements of a pretrial proceeding in California. "The accused has the right to personally appear at
the hearing, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine hostile
witnesses, to present exculpatory evidence, and to exclude illegally
obtained evidence."22 The Court then found that a proceeding with
such attributes was indeed similar enough in importance to the system and risk to the defendant that it justified the extension of Richmond Newspapers to allow access.22 8 Juvenile defendants received all of
the same rights in most delinquency proceedings.no In fact, in the
pretrial proceeding that the Court held "sufficiently like a trial " 2- to
justify finding a First Amendment right of access, there is actually less
at stake for the defendant than in ajuvenile proceeding, particularly
for a felony, for unlike a juvenile proceeding, and "unlike a criminal
trial, the California preliminary hearing cannot result in the conviction
of the accused."23' Further, the Court observed that, "[b] ecause of its
24 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
M Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) [hereinafter

Press-EntetprisefI].
M2 See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1993)
(reversing Puerto Rico's policy of Rule 23 pretrial proceedings, noting that "each of
the features cited by Press-Enterprise[HI in support of the finding that California's
preliminary hearings were 'sufficiently like a trial' to require public access is present
here"); cf supranotes 124-30 (examining the functional analysis performed by the
Court when searching for analogous common law causes of action when parties
seek ajury trial).
V Press-EnterpriseH, 478 U.S.
at 12.
SSee id. at 13.
V
The Supreme Court has granted juvenile defendants the rights to notice, to
counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, to protect against self-incrimination, see In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 81-57 (1967), to be convicted only after delinquency is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, see In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-68 (1970), and to
double jeopardy protection. SeeBreed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-31 (1975).
M Press-EnterpriseI, 478 U.S. at 12.
231 Id. (emphasis added).
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extensive scope, the preliminary hearing is often the final and most
important step in the criminal proceeding."' In the juvenile court,
the trial proceeding is always "the final and most important step" in
that system, truly offering the sole occasion for public observation of
the juvenile justice systemY2 Thus, a proceeding equal in its procedural complexity and actually ess threatening to the defendant than
ajuvenile proceeding still warranted constitutionally protected press
and public access. Under the standard in Press-EnterpriseII, the juvenile proceedings certainly reach the requisite level of adversity, severity, and complexity to merit press and public scrutiny.
In El Vocero, the most recent access decision, the Court further
clarified the underlying "sufficiently similar" test from Press-Enterprise
H. The Court underscored that Press-EnterpriseHI had struck down
California's private preliminary proceedings law "on the grounds
that preliminary criminal hearings have traditionally been public,
and because the hearings at issue were 'sufficiently like a
trial'.. . that public access was 'essential to the [ir] proper functioning.'"2 It seems that the Court has almost replaced the logic test
with a "sufficiently similar" standard, at least where, as here, the proceeding in question is very much like a proceeding already adjudicated to merit access.
In El Vocero, the Court addressed whether Puerto Rico's unique
pretrial proceeding, a so-called "Rule 23 hearing," met the tests for
access, including the "sufficiently similar" test. Finding that the privacy provision in Rule 23 was unconstitutional, the Court explained:
[Ejach of the features cited by Press-Enterprise[I] in support of the
finding that California's preliminary hearings were "sufficiently
like a trial" to require public access is present here. Rule 23 hearings are held before a neutral magistrate; the accused is afforded
the rights to counsel, to cross-examination, to present testimony,
and, at least in some instances, to suppress illegally seized evidence;.., in a substantial portion of criminal cases, the hearing
provides the only occasion for public observation of the criminal
justice system; and no jury is present.2
Such a description could just have easily been given of a typical
juvenile proceeding. In fact, juvenile proceedings are more like

23

Id. (emphasis added).

See generaly Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149 (1993) (citing
Pres.-EnterpriseI, 478 U.S. at 12).
M

20

Id. at 149-50.
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criminal trials than are Rule 23 hearings. In addition to defendants
being afforded similar procedural safeguards, in all instances the delinquency proceeding provides the only chance for public scrutiny of
the criminal justice system's treatment of juvenile defendants. As
with Rule 23 hearings, a jury is almost never present in juvenile proceedings. El Vocero provides us with the most recent and most germane discussion by the Court on the issue of access to a given judicial proceeding, and under the standard used, juvenile proceedings
would qualify for First Amendment access.
One of the key benchmarks used to gauge the seriousness of a
proceeding in a variety of constitutional contexts is the consequence
of a negative outcome for the defendant. 2W In other words, is something very significant, like the defendant's liberty, at stake? In the
juvenile justice context, the liberty of the defendant is profoundly
threatened. That Gerald Francis Gault, the juvenile defendant in the
proceeding that led to the landmark Gault decision, was sentenced
to six years in the State Industrial School proves that juveniles can
and do face a severe loss of liberty and that such a sentence is far beyond a merely rehabilitative aim; it is clearly punitive as well." 7
Judges conduct juvenile hearings in a criminal tone and with an eye
toward determination not of need, but of guilt.2" This punitive
mindset has only become more prevalent as the rehabilitative model
is increasingly questioned"9 and juvenile court judges face exploding
numbers of violent cases on their dockets.2 4
Gerald Gault's sentence led the Court to admit that juvenile
proceedings present a comparably "awesome prospect of incarceration" to the juvenile defendant as is faced by the adult defendant.24 1
Finding there to be "no material difference" in the need for counsel
in both adult and juvenile proceedings, the Court noted the high
See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (noting three levels of proof
for different types of cases, depending on the severity of the risk to the defendant);
see also generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (using risk to liberty as a
test in determining when an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to counsel,
holding that any defendant facing a risk to liberty via imprisonment is entitled to
counsel).
1 SeeIn reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1967).
2M See id. at 28-29 ("[T]he points to which the judge directed his attention were
little different from those that would be involved in determining any charge of violation of a penal statute.").
M

239

Se Mooax, supra note 223, at vii-ix.

"Over the 5-year period from 1988 through 1992, the juvenile courts saw a
disproportionate increase in violent offense cases and weapon law violations .... "
SNYDER & SICMuND, supra note 200, at 126.
240

241

Gault,387 U.S. at 36.
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degree to which ajuvenile defendant's freedom isjeopardized.2 Juvenile sentences, like the one in Gaut, often place a juvenile in custody until the age of majority, often five or more years away, even
when the adult sentence for a comparable crime is at most a few
months.4 In light of these sentencing realities, a ruling to detain a
juvenile can hardly be seen as benign. "A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution."2 4 Commitment to a juvenile "home" is incarceration and must be treated as such. According to the Gault Court:
"[Commitment] is incarceration against one's will, whether it is
called 'criminal' or 'civil. ' "245 Here again the Court sluffs off the labels used and addresses the empirical consequences in determining
constitutional ramifications.
The Court continued to take a functional analysis when determining which safeguards were needed in a given proceeding, again
refusing to stop at the level of labels. In its most aggressive attack on
those advocates seeking to limit debate on juvenile proceedings by
the labels they have been given, the Court demanded a much more
probing analysis:
Against the application to juveniles of the right to silence, it is argued thatjuvenile proceedings are "civil" and not "criminal," and
therefore the privilege should not apply.... However... the
availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the
statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.
Uluvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which may
lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as
"criminal" for the purposes of the privilege against selfincrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of thefeeble enticement of the "dvil" label-of-convenience which has
been attached to juvenile proceedings.246
Just as labeling a donation one way or deeming a peaceful demonstration another cannot foreclose a closer look when protecting
constitutional rights, 7 dubbing a procedure "civil" that has all the
24

Se id
SMu

PHY, supra note 202, at 5.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added).
245 Id. at 50.
248 Id. at 49-50 (emphasis added).
247 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
24M
244
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same dangers and opportunities for abuse as a criminal trial will not
foreclose full consideration of the empirical reality at hand.
Although the Supreme Court must ultimately apply the functional analysis to juvenile proceedings, the Court has, ironically, also
been one of the most influential forces shaping the juvenile justice
system. Of course, the juvenile system has been affected by countless
forces, and juvenile proceedings were falling far short of their informal, rehabilitative goals long before the Court's decisions in Kent
and GaulL. Indeed, this gap between reality and rhetoric motivated
the Court's involvement. But it was the Court's "constitutional domestication"24 9 of delinquency proceedings that radically overhauled
the juvenile justice system, reinstalling virtually all of the procedural
protections accorded an adult defendant.2
Both because of the
failure of reform and because of the Court's actions, by the late
1970s a juvenile delinquency proceeding was virtually indistinguishable from an adult trial.2 1
The Court's decisions in Gault and its progeny have radically reshaped the juvenile courts. As Chief Justice Burger commented in
his dissent in Winship, "The Court's opinion today rests entirely on
the assumption that all juvenile proceedings are 'criminal prosecutions,' hence subject to constitutional limitations. This derives from
earlier holdings, which, like today's holding, were steps eroding the
differences between juvenile courts and traditional criminal
248

See Gault,387 U.S. at 68 (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

("[W]e must recognize that the character and consequence of many juvenile court
proceedings have in fact closely resembled those of ordinary criminal trials .... ");

see also supra notes 170-223 and accompanying text (discussing the juvenile court
system's failure to make good on any of its lofty promises).
2

Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.

See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (finding thatjuvenile proceedings expose the defendant to jeopardy for the purposes of determining double jeopardy);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (holding that the defendant's right to use a
witness's past juvenile delinquency record for impeachment in cross-examination is
paramount to the state's interest in confidentiality of the witness's juvenile delinquency); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (declining to grant a right
to trial by jury to juveniles); In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (mandating that juveniles only be "convicted" using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard); GauU4
387 U.S. 1 (granting the right to notice, right to counsel, right against selfincrimination, and right to confront witnesses to juvenile defendants); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (demanding a minimum level of fairness and
due process injuvenile proceedings).
See Gault,387 U.S. at 68 (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that even before the Court's string of procedural-safeguard decisions "the
character and consequences of many juvenile court proceedings have in fact closely
resembled those of ordinary criminal trials"); see also Breed, 421 U.S. at 530 (juvenile
and criminal trials have consequences that are substantially indistinguishable).
2M
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courts."1 2 Thus, even while the Court was reinstating procedural
safeguards to protect children from a decidedly criminal proceeding,
those safeguards worked to make such proceedings even less like the
informal, contemplative "meetings of the minds" envisioned byjuvenile court reformers.
Perhaps the most honest assessment of the impact of Gaut, the
most sweeping of the major decisions, came from Justice Black's
concurrence. He stated succinctly, "This holding strikes a well-nigh
fatal blow to much that is unique about the juvenile courts."25 3 Justice Black's sentiment is endemic to the Court's: respectful of the
system's goals but concerned over the system's lack of workability.
He continued:
The juvenile court planners envisaged a system that would practically immunize juveniles from "punishment" for "crimes" in an
effort to save them from youthful indiscretions and stigmas due
to criminal charges or convictions. I agree with the Court, however, that this exalted ideal has failed of achievement since the beginning
of the systen.
In requiring traditional criminal procedures to safeguard juvenile defendants, the Court has admitted the failure of the system to
protect juveniles through parens patriae. Finding that rights had
been given up not for benevolence and informality but for inconsistent, arbitrary, and disturbingly adult outcomes, the Gault Court began to nail shut the coffin on an informal, nonadversarial juvenile
system with the hammer of procedural safeguards. As Justice Black's
concurrence explained, however, these safeguards were both necessary and overdue:
Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State,
charged, and convicted for violating a state criminal law, and
then ordered by the State to be confined for six years, I think the
Constitution requires that he be tried in accordance with the
guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 5
In the end, the Court took steps not to destroy the dream of a
new model for juvenile justice, but to save the liberty and humanity
of those individual children caught up in a system gone wrong.
It became apparent just how tightly Gault had closed the coffin
on the rehabilitative/civil juvenile delinquency proceeding when the
2 2

0
M
M

Winship, 397 U.S. at 375-76 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
Gault, 387 U.S. at 60 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 61 (Black,J., concurring).
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Court next considered applying further procedural safeguards to juvenile proceedings in In re Wiwhip.m In that case, the issue was
whether a juvenile court could find a minor delinquent based on a
mere preponderance of the evidence, as the New York Family Court
had done, or "whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt [was]
among the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment' required
during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act
which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult." 7 Once
again, when faced with a concrete issue, the Court looked at function
over form and found in favor of using the criminal standard, further
discrediting the nonadversarial model.
The Supreme Court flatly rebuffed the attempt by the New York
Court of Appeals to rely on the civil label and the benevolent intentions generally presumed of juvenile proceedings. The Court stated
that Gault had "expressly rejected" both the "civil label-ofconvenience" and the notion that "juvenile proceedings are designed 'not to punish, but to save the child,'" as reasons not to apply
constitutional scrutiny to juvenile proceedings.'
By the time the
Court decided Winship, it was committed to the functional analysis:
"We made it clear in [Gault] that civil labels and good intentions do
not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards
in juvenile courts. ... "2"
The Court only gave pause to its reinstallation movement when
it refused to require that juvenile proceedings be tried to a jury in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania." Although the holding refused to extend
this particular constitutional safeguard, the Court's dicta continued
to express disappointment and alarm over the system the Justices saw
before them.2' In fact, the Court's opinion essentially condemned
the juvenile justice system of the present, while merely holding out
hope that it might still "contain the seeds from which a truly appropriate system can be brought forth."26 2 In short, the Court put the
juvenile justice system on probation, disheartened by the results to
that point, but unwilling to pull the plug just yet in hopes of future
change.

397 U.S. 358 (1970).
2

Id. at 359.

w Id. at 365.
a Id. at 365-66.
no 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
"I1 See id. at 534.
"2

Id. at 540 (citations omitted).
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The McKeiver opinion has since been widely criticized for granting the juvenile justice system this period of probation. M Ultimately,
the Court chose to ignore the present in hopes of a brighter future.
The future, however, is now, and the outlook is decidedly dim. As
Joseph Sanborn has articulated, today's juvenile justice system is even
more punitive, more criminal, and more abusive than it was when
the Court heard McKeiver. With admitted hindsight, the Court's
holding in McKeiver is ultimately faulty; by ignoring the empirical
data and failing to address the need for public scrutiny of the system
itself, the Court did nothing more than perpetuate a broken system.
McKeiver, then, offered the juvenile justice system a reprieveone last chance to implement the "idealistic prospect of an intimate,
Nevertheless, by 1975 the
informal protective proceeding."2
"ero[sion of] the differences between juvenile courts and traditional
criminal courts" that began with Kent and continued through Gault
and Winship was nearly complete.2 With little of the hopeful rhetoric of the McKeiver decision, and with even less deference to it, the
Court continued to grant safeguards to juvenile defendants in Breed
v. Jones.2 The holding and dicta of Breed showjust how far the Court
has come toward viewing juvenile proceedings as criminal trials. The
issue in Breed was "whether the prosecution of respondent as an
adult, after Juvenile Court proceedings which resulted in a finding
that respondent had violated a criminal statute and a subsequent
finding that he was unfit for treatment as a juvenile, violated the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."2 Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger found
that the Double Jeopardy Clause had been violated.29 Ironically, it
was the Chief Justice whose dissent in Winship five years earlier had
warned of the demise of the juvenile proceeding.20'

2

Se, e.g., CturoRD DoRNE & KENN=- GEwERTH, AmERicAN JuvENaL JuSflCE:
CASEs, LEGISLATION AND Co MmErs 574-76 (1995);Joseph B. SanbornJr., The Right to
a PublicJuty Trial: A Need for Today's Juvenile Court, 76 JumICATuRE 230, 233 n.26

(1993).

6 Se- Sanborn, supra note 263, passim.
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing
the erosion of the differences "between juvenile courts and traditional criminal
courts").

261 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
2U Id. at 520.
Mg See id. at 532-33.
20 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The Court's holding illustrates its larger view of juvenile proceedings. The issue of double jeopardy is particularly illustrative of
the Court's shift in thinking toward a criminal framework. In determining whether jeopardy attaches in juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Court explains, "In the constitutional sense, jeopardy
describes the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal
prosecution ....
[T]he risk to which the [Double Jeopardy] Clause
refers is not present in proceedings that are not 'essentially criminal.'"'
For the Court to hold as it does, then, is to admit that juvenile proceedings have indeed become "essentially criminal" proceedings.
Almost reflectively, the Court seems to realize that too much has
transpired in the modern juvenile justice system, both in the form of
case law and empirical developments, to deny the similarities of juvenile and adult trials:
We believe it is simply too late in the day to conclude ... that a
juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to
determine whether he has committed acts that violate a criminal
law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for
many years.
This holding is especially damning, because it flatly refutes the
notion that such proceedings are rehabilitative and nonpunitive as
well as the rhetoric that the juvenile justice system neither stigmatizes juveniles nor threatens their liberty. "[I]n terms of potential
consequences, there is little to distinguish [a juvenile] adjudicatory
hearing... from a traditional criminal prosecution.""
The series of Supreme Court cases beginning with Gault and
ending with Breed may have established procedural rights forjuvenile
defendants, but their relevance does not stop there. The argument
could be made that the Supreme Court is willing to admit that juvenile proceedings are criminal when looking at the rights of the juvenile, but will still cling to a quasi-civil label in other contexts. That
argument, however, must ultimately fall. If such a line can be drawn,
it seems to be artificial, propped up not by tangible differences, but
by wishful thinking. 7 4 The Court's opinions show time after time
that juvenile hearings fail to meet the goal of a civil, informal, nonpunitive, nonadversarial proceeding. The truth in those findings
27

272
27

Breed, 421 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 529 (emphasis added).

Id. at 530.

See supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's "wishful thinking").
2
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cannot be ignored when the focus turns to the access question, or
any other question outside the realm of procedural safeguards.
The Court in Richmond Newspapers found public access to criminal justice proceedings necessary because of what was threatenedthe defendant's liberty and good name-and who was doing the
threatening-the state, via the judiciary. Because we all have an interest in the proper functioning of our governmental institutions,
scrutiny protects the community at large as well as individual defendants. By its nature, the criminal court determines guilt and exacts a
punishment. The power to make such decisions and demand such
burdens, according to the Court, must be monitored by the general
public to ensure that it is not abused."5 Such scrutiny protects the
individual defendant currently on trial, all other present and future
defendants, and thus all of us, or-in the case of juvenile proceedings-all of our children. But it also protects communities by ensuring that the judiciary performs its duty to protect the general public.
Neither a system that coddles dangerous criminals nor one that is
overly-punitive to younger, small-time offenders can be considered
successful. Both the community and the defendant share an interest
in securing proper scrutiny of the system, and neither one can or
should speak to the exclusion of the other."'
The Court's opinions in the Gault line of cases, and the empirical data available, prove that what occurs in juvenile proceedings is
not substantially different from what occurs in adult trials. That being so, precedent demands that juvenile proceedings cannot and
should not be shrouded in secrecy, regardless of the wishes of any
individual defendant. Not only should such requests be discounted
because of the source-what defendant, of any age, would wish to
have his or her transgressions made public knowledge-but because
of the source's lack of knowledge about the system. The juvenile
may think privacy will serve his or her interests, but once shrouded,
the inadequacies of the system are also hidden from the public's
gaze. The well-reasoned decision to force accountability of our
judges and judicial personnel through public access is the foundation of a right shared by the accused and the community. Thus, the
Gault line of cases stands for more than a need to protect the actual
defendant. Those cases must also stand for a need to protect the

See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussing public scrutiny of
theuvenile system).
See infra notes 327-72 and accompanying text (discussing the need for public
access to juvenile proceedings in order to garner public support for the system).
275
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community from a system that threatens the same values as were
threatened by a closed adult criminaljustice system.
If it was "too late in the day" to deny the criminal nature of juvenile proceedings in 1975, then night has truly fallen since that
time. The Supreme Court's decisions following Kent left juveniles
with an impressive array of procedural safeguards: the right to counsel, the right to notice of specific charges of offense, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to subpoena defense
witnesses, the right to remain silent, the right to be tried with a burden beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to have jeopardy attach to a juvenile proceeding. 7" In 1985, a former president of the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges deemed juvenile proceedings "[i]n almost all particulars ... like [] criminal
trial[s]." 7 8 The conditions in juvenile detention facilities are still deplorable-facilities are overcrowded, and just sixteen percent of
long-term custody facilities meet the Department ofJustice's six basic
health service criteria.27 Further, coming under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court is an even greater threat to liberty today. "States
are incarcerating more juvenile offenders for longer periods and redefining more of them as adults."2" In short, compared with the juvenile justice system the Court saw as increasingly criminal two decades ago, today's system is more punitive, more crowded, and less
healthy-with longer and harder time being served by juveniles.
V. APPLYING THE RIChIMOND NEWSPAPERS TEST TOJUVENILE
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS

As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has yet to decide officially
whether the press and public, via the First Amendment, have a right
of access to juvenile proceedings. Having first examined the Court's
analysis in answering access questions,"' and subsequently studying
how the modem juvenile justice system functions, m I turn now to
the task of determining if the press and public should be allowed acSee supra note 250 (citing the decisions after Kent granting procedural protections to juveniles).
27

278 CARL E. GUERNSEY, HANDBOOK FORJUVENILE COURTJUDGES

18 (1985); see also

Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 282 n.3 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("In most
respects... such a hearing is the functional equivalent of an ordinary criminal

trial.-).

27" See SNYDERI
& SICKMUND, supranote 200, at 170, 173.
"0 PATRIcIA ToauRB" ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTIc E AND DELINQUENCY
VENTION, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENTJJVENILE CRIME 34 (1996).
281 See supra Parts I and II.
2

See supra Part IV.
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cess to juvenile proceedings even over a juvenile defendant's objections. The discussion of juvenile proceedings in Part IV will be applied to the Richmond Newspapers line of cases. 2"

Part V considers

Richmond Newspapers' "two complementary considerations":28 ' first,
"whether the place and process have historically been open to the

press and general public" 2 -- the experience test-and, second,
"whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question" 2"-the logic test.
A.

Applying the Experience Test toJuvenile Proceedings
The experience test looks at what treatment the process in ques-

tion has been given historically, in both more recent "modem history" and more importantly "colonial history."2" These factors, as
they relate to juvenile proceedings, find a mixed modem history and
a colonial history where juveniles were tried in open court.
Considering first "colonial history," it is undisputed that any juvenile accused of breaking a criminal law was tried in an open, adult
criminal trial at the time our organic laws were adopted and the
Constitution ratified.2 ' Any child over the age of criminal responsibility-"seven at common law and in some of our states, ten in others"-was treated no differently than any other criminal defendant.2 "
2"

I have argued that juvenile delinquency proceedings operate much like

criminal trials and that notions of a distinct, quasi-civil proceeding are mere rhetoric. See supra notes 224-80 and accompanying text. I have also highlighted that the
Court has extended the right of access to proceedings that are "sufficiently like a
[criminal] trial." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986)
[hereinafter Press-Enterprisefl]; see also supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text. It
seems, therefore, that the Richmond Newspapers test provides the proper analysis of
this issue. Nevertheless, some argue that juvenile proceedings are civil proceedings
and that Richmond Newspapers and its progeny are thus inapplicable. See, e.g., Douglas A. Bahr, Note, Associated Press v. Bradshaw: The Right of Press Access Extended to
Juvenile Proceedingsin South Dakota, 34 S.D. L. REv. 738, 750 (1989). Based on the
functional analysis ofjuvenile proceedings, concluding, as has the Supreme Court,
that the civil label is merely a "label-of-convenience," Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
529 (1975), this paper rejects the use of the civil label and therefore applies the
Richmond Newspapers test. See supraPart IV (applying the Richmond Newspapers test to
juvenile proceedings).
Presas-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. at 8.
Id.
Id.
U7 These phrases are my own. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying
text. For
a discussion of this bifurcated view, see generally supra notes 74-101 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of
juveniles historically).
Mack, supra note 139, at 106.
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Although it may seem like a truism to say that juveniles were treated
equally with adults before there were juvenile courts established to
treat them differently, it is a key point in the experience analysis. In
looking for "appropriate analogies" to twentieth-century juvenile
proceedings, how the judicial system treated juveniles in 1791 must
be examined.2 ° Subsequent developments such as the turn-of-thecentury reform movement do not diminish the importance of colonial history in the Court's analysis, nor do they change the fact that
the historical analogue to the "mongrel" procedure that is the modem juvenile proceeding was the adult (then simply the only) criminal trial.2' The dominant consideration under the experience test in
previous Supreme Court decisions has been one of original intent:"
"[I] n our prior cases history mattered primarily for what it revealed
about the intentions of the Framers and ratifiers of the First
Amendment."2 ' Asking what the Framers would have seen at the
trial of a juvenile, therefore, is to ask what they would have seen at
any criminal trial: full access by the general public.2 It was this tradition of access that served as the "background of shared values and
practices" against which the Constitution and the First Amendment
were drafted.25
In considering the modem history element of the experience
test-that period running from ratification to the present day-the
question ofjuvenile proceedings requires an examination of two distinct phases: (1) from 1791 until the first juvenile courts act was
passed in 1899 and (2) from that point to the present day. Even
framing the discussion in this manner points out another piece of
the historical puzzle. For a large portion of the post-ratification
"modem period," proceedings involving juveniles remained open.
So, in addition to the colonial period being one of access to juvenile
criminal proceedings, nearly the entire first century of the modem
era saw open criminal proceedings against juveniles as well. Not un-

20
2

SeTull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987).

See supra notes 225-73 and accompanying text (equating the juvenile proceed-

inwith the criminal proceeding).

See supra notes 75-93 and accompanying text (discussing how the historical
test serves primarily as a test of original intent).
2s Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 22
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Pre.s-Enterprise 11.
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-69 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
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til the first juvenile court act was passed in 1899 was any real attention paid to howjuveniles were treated by the court system.'
At the turn of the century, only Illinois had passed legislation
creating a juvenile court.2" Over the next half-century, every other
state adopted some kind of juvenile justice legislation.2 ' Although
juveniles have been subjected to proceedings addressing criminal
acts for as long as adults have been subject to the process, specialized
proceedings addressing criminal acts of juveniles alone are a relatively new development.
Even within this small subset of history during which there have
been special juvenile proceedings, the attitude of the juvenile justice
system toward press and public access, both from individual judges
and statutory mandates, has been far from uniform. Ten years after
the experiment began, only a handful of states excluded the general
public.' " Ten years after that, when a majority of states had passed
juvenile courts legislation, "a comprehensive survey found [that]
seven states bann[ed] the publication of juvenile court proceedings."m" Early versions of the Standard Juvenile Court Act did not
call for confidentiality, " and subsequent versions allowed access only
for those with a "direct interest in the case."2 Not until 1949 was the
decision about who had a direct interest vested solely in the presidingjudge- " " In 1965, the Advisory Council of Judges of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency advocated cooperation with the
media by juvenile court judges, " arguing that juvenile courts had an
"obligation" to provide the news media with information about the
daily operations ofjuvenile proceedings. ' Indeed, the record is var-

96

See Lou, supra note 139, at 19.

7See id.
29

See Geis, supra note 147, at 105 (citations omitted). "Wyoming was the last to

join the [juvenile court] movement, finally inaugurating ajuvenile court system in
1951." Id.; see also supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (discussing the issue).
29 See Geis, supra note 147, at 116.
300

Id.

301 See COMMrrrEE ON STANDARD JUVENILE COURT LAws,

NATIONAL PROBATION

ASSOCIATION, A STANDARDJuvENIE COURT LAw § 13 (1926).
32" COMMrrEE ON STANDARD JUVENILE COURT LAWS, NATIONAL PROBATION ASSOCIATION, A STANDARDJuvENILE COURT LAw § 13 (1933).
Sos See NATIONAL PROBATION AND PARoLE ASSOCIATION, A STANDARDJuvENmz COuRT

ACT§ 17 (1949).

04 See ADVisoRy COUNCIL OF JuDGEs, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELIN-

QuENcy, GuiDas FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGzS ON NEws MEDA REGULATIONS 5, 8-9
(1965) [hereinafter GUIDEs FORJUVENILE COURTJUDGES].
30

See id. at 5.
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ied enough to say that the issue of press and public access has never
been completely settled.
Although it is certainly true that the public and press are often
excluded from modem juvenile proceedings, the mixed approach to
the question of access remains a reality today. State laws remain far
from unified in the level of access they allow to juvenile proceedings.
Nationwide, the degree of confidentiality and approaches taken by
states remains, as one commentator has put it, a kind of patchwork,' with recent trends decidedly pro-access.0 In this patchwork
are statutes ranging from mandated access to near-mandated closure. Three states expressly require press or public access in all
cases,308 and twelve others require access where the juvenile has been
charged with having committed a violent felony, with some states
adding age restrictions as well.- In nine other states there is at least
a presumption in favor of openness, and some of those permit closure only upon a finding of certain specific circumstances.1 0 Seven
SeeJonas, supranote 172, at 295.
See ToRBr ET AL., supranote 280, at 35.
See 705 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 405/1-5(6) (West 1992); MONT. CoDEANN. § 415-1502(7) (1997) (general public may not be excluded from delinquency proceedint; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16(B) (Michie 1995).
See CAL. WEL.F. & INST. CODE § 676 (West 1984) (access required in cases involving a list of enumerated violent offenses); DEL. CODE ANN. tt. 10, § 1063(a)
(1975 & Supp. 1996) (proceedings involving juveniles charged with felonies must
be open); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(c) (1994) (open for all felony and repeat offenders); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1652 (1993) (access required in all cases where the
juveniles are 16 or older, and in all cases with defendants over 14 unless access for
these younger juveniles is found not to be in the best interest of the child); LA.
STAT. ANN. ch. C, art. 879(B) (West 1995) (proceedings open when involving a
crime of violence or defendant is a repeat felony offender); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 3307(2) (West 1980) (all felonies); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (West
1993) (requiring access in all cases where the state has proceeded by indictmentpresumably a vehicle for opening all cases involving serious felonies); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.155(1) (West 1992) (all felonies allegedly committed by juveniles 16
and older); Mo. Rxv. STAT. § 211.171(5) (1996) (open for all cases involving Class
A and B felonies, and repeat felony offenders); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 6336
(West 1982) (access required in all felony cases where defendant over 14, and in
enumerated serious felony cases where defendant over 12); S.D. CODIFID LAws §
26-7A-36 (Michie 1992) (proceedings for violent crimes or certain drug felonies
shall be open); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-511(1)-(2) (1996) (age 16 or older and
charged with felony, court may close these proceedings on particular findings).
See Aiuz. Juv. Or. R. 7(c) (presumed open except upon written finding of
clear public interest in closure); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-106(2) (West 1990)
(hearings must be open unless closure would serve the public's or the juvenile's interest); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.052(1) (c) (West 1996) (repealed 1998) (court must be
open unless closure is held by the presiding judge to serve the public interest and
the welfare of the child); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-7-10(b) (West 1979) (access must
be granted where defendant charged with a felony unless closure necessary to pro-

1998]

MEDIA ACCESS

1205

states essentially leave the issue to the court's discretion without establishing a presumption."'
Even with recent pro-access trends, more often than not juvenile proceedings remain closed to the public.312 In sixteen states,
hearings are presumptively closed, but the judge has discretion to
open them. Usually, parties with a "direct" or "proper' interest in
the case or the work of the court can be permitted access at the discretion of the judge. Several states have interpreted this language to
permit access to the press.""' Only two states actually limit access to
tect the welfare of the child on specific written findings); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.39
(West 1994) (closure only if court finds that harm to juvenile outweighs public interest in open proceedings); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.17(7) (West 1993)
(permitting closure if necessary to protect juvenile welfare after consultation of
enumerated factors); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 62.193(1) (Michie 1996) (must be
open absent finding closure in best interest of child, and then only those portions
of hearing necessary to preserve the interest); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.08 (West
1996) (open unless judge rules closure is required for good cause); VA. CODE ANN. §
16.1-302 (Michie 1996) (open for felony cases where defendant over 14; judge may
close for good cause and upon a written public statement of reasons).
311 See ARi. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(i) (Michie 1993); MD. R. Juv. CAuss
11-110;
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-60(g) (West 1987) (court "may" permit access if there is no
"substantial likelihood [of] specific harm" to the juvenile); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 341.1
(McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-629 (1997); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35
(Anderson 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-124 (1996).
312 It should be noted that this Article's analysis focuses on cases
where the juvenile defendant either shows no preference or actively seeks closure of the proceeding. Where a defendant seeks access, the discussion must shift to the Sixth
Amendment. Some state statutes specifically mandate open proceedings if the defendant requests that the public be allowed to attend. See, e.g., A1AsKA STAT. §
47.10.070 (Michie 1996) (requiring that the hearing be open upon the juvenile's
request); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(i) (Michie 1993) (same); CAL. WE.LF. & INST.
CODE § 676 (West 1984) (same). Others fail to mention a specific right to a public
trial. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-76h (West 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 162316(e) (1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:34 (1994). Case law has been mixed,
with some courts holding that the juvenile is entitled to a public trial. See generaly
R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (juvenile's right to public trial is guaranteed); In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 536 (La. 1978) (juvenile must be granted public trial if
so requested). Other courts have extended the notion that the proceeding is not
criminal into Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. See generally In re McM., 105 Cal.
App. 3d 187 (1980) (no constitutional right to a public trial); In re D.H., 666 A.2d
462 (D.C. 1995) (delinquency proceedings are not criminal proceedings within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment). While it seems that the Sixth Amendment
should allow access when the defendant seeks a public venue, such a discussion is
beyond the scope of this Article, which instead focuses on resolving the situation
where the juvenile and/or the state seek a confidential proceeding, and the press or
another third party seeks access.
313 See, e.g., Brian W. v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 788, 791 (Cal.
1978)
(concluding that the California legislature intended similar language "to allow
press attendance atjuvenile hearings"); In re R.L.K., 269 N.W.2d 367, 370-71 (Minn.
1978) (concluding that "[t]he weight of authority is that the news media have a
'direct interest' in the work of the court" because 1It]he news media have a strong
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juvenile proceedings without mentioning judicial discretion to admit
others."'
The national trend is clearly toward rethinking confidential juvenile proceedings. 5 Between 1992 and 1995, ten states passed statutes favoring open juvenile proceedings.318 Since that time, seven
additional states have followed the pro-access trend,-"' which is likely
to continue in light of the mounting public concern about continued violence byjuveniles.31 8
The history of juvenile proceedings, in short, has been one of
total access during colonial history, continued full access1 during
the first half of modern history, and mixed access only during the
past eighty or so years, with increasing trends in the past five years
toward restoring access. Applying that history to the Richmond Newspapers tests and comparing it to the histories of other proceedings
upon which the Court has ruled, particularly the pretrial proceedings in Press-EnterpriseII and El Vocero,5" juvenile proceedings on balance have been sufficiently open to "have been accorded 'the favor-

interest in obtaining information regarding our legal institutions and an interest in
informing the public about how judicial power in juvenile courts is being exercised"); In re L., 546 P.2d 153, 155 n.1 (Or. C. App. 1976) (same). Several state
statutes and court rules currently use this language. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a)
(1995); HAw. Rav. STAT. § 571-41(b) (1993); IDAHOJUV. R. 37, 52; Ky. REy. STAT.
ANN. § 610.070(3) (Michie 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-203(6) (1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-24(5) (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-4.1 (West 1987);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-30 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-755 (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5523(c) (1995); WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 13.34.110 (West
1993); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-2(i) (1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.299 (West 1997); Wro.
STAT. ANN. § 14-6-224(b) (Michie 1997). Other states similarly permit the court to
open proceedings in its discretion. See ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (Michie 1996);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(e) (1997) (noting expressly that press may be admitted).
314 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-76h (West 1994); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 169B:34 (1994). Two states, Nebraska and Oregon, have no statute regulating access to
juvenile proceedings.
315 See TORBET ETAL., supra note 280, at 35.
316 Statutes were passed in California, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah. See id. at 45.
3
Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, South Dakota, and Virginia
have all passed statutes increasing the level of access allowed in their respective juvenile courts in the last two years.
318 See Gordon A. Martin,Jr., Open theDoors: A Judicial Call to End Confidentiality in
Delinquency Proceedings, 21 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Cw. CONFNM-.r 393, 393-95
(1995).
3
That is to say, access parallel to that given to press and public attending adult
criminal trials.
0 See supra notes 88-101
and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's decisions in Press-EntffrpiseII and El Vocero).
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able judgment of experience, ' " 2 ' thereby meeting the experience
test.
B. Applying the Logic Test toJuvenile Proceedings
The logic half of the Richmond Newspapers test simply asks
whether opening the proceeding in question will produce benefits
justifying such access. As discussed in Part II, the Court considers
first whether access will benefit the First Amendment's goal of an informed, involved, and scrutinizing public and second whether access
will improve the functioning of the specific procedure at hand.32
The Court has highlighted several specific benefits of granting access
to the various proceedings it has considered opening. This section
will focus on those already developed benefits and determine how
well they analogize to juvenile proceedings.
Skyrocketing juvenile crime, especially violent juvenile crime,'
has brought public sentiment to a boiling point.324 A recent Department of Justice report confirms that this sentiment is based not simply on rhetoric, but on fact: juvenile arrests for violent crime increased by 50% between 1988 and 1994 and juvenile arrests for

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (quoting Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982)) [hereinafter PressEnterprisefl].
See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's "logic test").
snSee HowARD N. SNYDER ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FORJUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE
3

1996 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 14 (1996) ("[T]he juvenile violent crime arrest rate soared between 1988 and 1994.").
32
See Elizabeth Mehren, Girl Trouble: America's Overlooked Crime Problem, LA.
TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1996, at El (observing that public ranks juvenile crime as a major
threat and views juvenile statutes as overly indulgent); Joseph Neff, Judge Urges Rewording of Code, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),Jan. 26, 1997, at A14 (revealing
that opinion polls show increasing fear ofjuvenile crime and a sense that juvenile
justice is outstripped by modern juvenile crime);Judith Van deWater, Vwlent Cime
Brings Changing View ofJuvenile Codes-Some Officials Favor Opening Up of Information
on Young Offenders, ST. Louis POsr-DsPATc.H, Jan. 3, 1995, at 1 (community favors
tougher juvenile laws and access to information about juvenile proceedings). This
is not to say that the public does not still support the notion that children should be
rehabilitated. Recent polls suggest the public has not given up on the reform ideal.
See Frank Green & Michael Hardy, RehabilitationFavored; Crime Rate Down, FiguresSay
Juvenile Crime More Violent, RICHMOND TimzS-DisPATCH, OcL 14, 1995, at B1 (twothirds of those polled favored rehabilitation over punishment even with increased
violence in juvenile crime). Rather, the public is unconvinced and unsupportive of
the currentjuvenile justice system, not with the system's goals. See, e.g., Most in Poll
WantJuveniles Tried as Adults, BATON ROUGE Anvoc., Mar. 16, 1987, at 1B (one person polled on whether juveniles should be tried as adults replied, "Yes, I do, but
they should have a fair chance at rehabilitation").
OFFENDsS AND Victms:
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weapons violations grew 103% during that same period.5 " The juvenile court's need to address 2public concern and gain public support
has never been more acute.
Granting access to juvenile proceedings will in all likelihood address one of the most important benefits of access-namely, public
support for the system." "People in an open society do not demand
infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing."s" As one juvenile
judge has noted, keeping juvenile proceedings confidential
"unnecessarily [brings] down upon Uuvenile courts] public misunderstanding and even hostility."' Thirty years after that statement,
another judge observed the public's "growing perception that something is seriously wrong with our handling of youth."'
This
prompted his call for lifting the "cloak of confidentiality... to rebuild[] trust and dissipate[] the fear that the closed juvenile system
fosters. "n"s Justice Brennan's warning in Richmond Newspapers has become the reality of the public's perception ofjuvenile courts today.
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of
the trial process. Open trials assure the public that procedural
rights are respected, and that justice is afforded equally. Closed
trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in
turn spawns disrespect for law. Public access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining public confidence in the administration ofjustice."

SmeSNYDER ErAL.,

supra note 323, at 14, 21.

The juvenile arrest rate for violent crime in 1994 was "far above any year since
the mid-1960's, the earliest time period for which comparable statistics are available." Id. at 14.
3V This is a commonly held belief of modem pro-access
reformers. See generaly
Martin, supra note 318; see also supra note 324 (noting that the public is angry at this
system but still supports rehabilitation); infra notes 333-36 (finding that the Supreme Court recognizes that greater public access generally improves the public's
outlook on a proceeding).
328 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980)
(plurality
opinion).
"

GuiDEs FoRJuvENuLE COURTJUDGES,

supra note 304, at 14 (quoting William G.

Long, then a Seattle juvenile courtjudge). Judge Long went on to explain that he
had similar problems "until [he] took the news media into partnership," a practice
he suggested other judges follow. See id.
3W Martin, supra note 318, at 394.
331

Id. at 394-95.

Richmond Naspapers,448 U.S. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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The Court has recognized access as a way to buoy public support, at least to the extent the proceeding warrants such support. m
In discussing public access to voir dire, the Court explained, "This
open process gave assurance... that others were able to observe the
proceedings and enhanced public confidence."It seems reasonable, then, to assume that the public's lack of confidence in the juvenile justice system springs in part from the secrecy surrounding its
proceedings, and at least some of that animosity would be diminished by reversing a policy of confidentiality.
In addition to the support of the population, the Supreme
Court has recognized the beneficial community outlet that open
proceedings provide:
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage
and public protest often follows. Thereafter the open processes
ofjustice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an
outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. Without
an awareness that society's responses to criminal conduct are underway, natural human reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful
"self-help," as indeed they did regularly in the activities of vigilante "committees" on our frontiers.tm
The Court here was discussing adult crimes, but the anger, frustration, and need to see justice done is no less pressing when the
perpetrator happens to be a juvenile. 3" It is precisely this kind of
outlet of which communities are robbed by closed juvenile proceedings. " ' Particularly in light of increasingly violent juvenile crime,'
our larger social order would benefit from a juvenile court system
that allows the public to see justice done and begin to heal accordingly-or, just as importantly, allows the public to see injustice done,

Cf. Florida Bar Ass'n v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995); see also infra
note 339 (discussingJustice Kennedy's dissent in Forida Bar).
& Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 507 (1984) [hereinafter
Press-Entfrfpise 1].
S5 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (citation omitted).
'The harm suffered by the victim of a crime is not dependent upon the age of
theyerpetrator." Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1984).
Se Preu-Entuyrise I, 464 U.S. at 509 ("When the public is aware that the law is
being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an outlet is provided
for these understandable reactions and emotions. Proceedings held in secret would
dey this outlet and frustrate the broad public interest.").
See supra notes 325-26 and accompanying text (discussing the increasingly violent nature ofjuvenile crime).

1210

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:1155

and begin to work toward change.-" g Simply put, "the appearance of
justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it." "
Public access to juvenile proceedings is not beneficial solely to
the general public, or to the individual community touched byjuvenile crime, but to the proceeding and to the individual defendant as
well. The Court has long recognized that "[plublic access to court
proceedings is one of the numerous 'checks and balances' of our system, because 'contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.'"
That juvenile proceedings are almost never heard by a jury and are
rarely appealed 4 2 further exacerbates the need for public scrutiny via
general access. In discussing preliminary proceedings that were also
carried out without a jury, the Court in Press-EnterpiiseII noted the
heightened importance of public scrutiny in light of the lack of a
jury-the other major public check on the justice system. "[T]he absence of a jury... makes the importance of public access to a pre43 Juvenile proceedings,
liminary hearing even more significant."m
which often consider matters with higher stakes and greater importance than pretrial proceedings, should demand at least the level of
public scrutiny the Court has deemed appropriate for the pretrial
process.
"9 This point should not be under-emphasized. A fear that the public's reaction
to the juvenile justice system might be one of outrage or concern does not justify
denying access. Observe Justice Kennedy's dissent in FloridaBarAss'n v.Went ForIt,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995), where the Court upheld a prohibition on direct-mail
solicitation of personal injury or wrongful death clients within 30 days partially on
grounds that such actions reflected poorly on the legal profession. See id. at 2381.
Justice Kennedy eloquently notes that concern for reputation, for a profession, or
for the government cannot and should not justify limiting public exposure to the
problem. See id. at 23883 (Kennedy,J., dissenting). If the sight of an unseemly practice tarnishes an image, the Justice argues, "itmust be remembered that real progress begins with more rational speech, not less." Id. at 2386 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Here, as there, if the system is inept or corrupted, then public access will
allow a real opportunity to "improv[e] the substance" of the juvenile courts. See id.
As one commentator put it, "[i]f the public was informed about how the juvenile
system functions-and more importantly, does not function-this might prompt an
'understandable community reaction of outrage and public protest' over the way
children are suffering within the juvenile system." Jan L. Trasen, Note, Privacy v.
Public Access to Juvenile CourtProceedings: Do Closed HearingsProtect the Child or the Systen?, 15 B.C. THIIWWoRLDL.J. 359, 382 (1995).
540 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572.
341 Id. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270

(1948)).

SSee Bahr, supra note 283, at 756.
S Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1986) (citing
Dun-

can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)) [hereinafter Press-Enteprise11].
3" See infra notes 851-61 and accompanying text (outlining the benefits of public
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The Court has taken a functional approach to determining
whether the benefits of opening one type of proceeding translate to
other types of proceedings. In discussing the extension of access to
pretrial proceedings, the Court said in Press-EnterpriseII "We have
already determined ... that public access to criminal trials and the
selection ofjurors is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal
justice system. California preliminary hearings are suffiiently like a
trial to justify the same conclusion."35 In other words, if one proceeding is sufficiently analogous to another, then the benefits of
opening that proceeding are also analogous.
How the system performs under public scrutiny is important
both because of the need for social peace via the system and because
of the important check on governmental action provided by public
scrutiny. Criminal justice proceedings earn the public's support by
demonstrating that such proceedings fulfill their roles. Juvenile
proceedings on the other hand are an easy and frequent target of
criticisms because the secrecy of the proceedings prevents the public from seeing what is occurring. ' The public thus naturally assumes the worst-that the system "is trying to hide its inefficiency in
secrecy."'
Some have argued that is precisely the case.0 Others
claim that the juvenile justice system and the actors involved function "diligently and effectively.""" Either way, the proper solution is
to allow the public to perform its constitutionally assigned roleindeed its civic duty-to scrutinize the system in action.
The logic test, again, focuses not only on benefits to society as a
whole, but on whether access will help maintain and improve the
quality of individual proceedings."' One gauge of how well a process
is functioning, especially in a criminal justice proceeding, is whether
scrutiny to the defendant).
4
Press-EnterpriseH, 478 U.S. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
See infra note 349 and accompanying text (citing criticisms of the juvenile system).
47 See T. Markus Funk, Young & Arrstless, REASON, Feb.
1, 1996, at 50 (general
public is unable to evaluate the juvenile justice system for lack of information about
its 2Perations).
GUIDES FORJuVENILE COURTJUDGEs, supranote 304, at 14.

See MuRPIhY, supra note 202, at viii (secrecy of juvenile proceedings perpetuated to protect those who operated the system); see also generally Trasen, supra note
339 (the veil of secrecy over juvenile proceedings only serves to hide the flaws of the
system, ultimately more detrimental to the children than public access would ever
be); David Glovin, Secrecy Courts Operate Behind Closed Doors, THE RFcoRD, Feb. 14,
1994, at A01 (same).
Martin, supra note 318, at 395.
See supranotes 102-06 and accompanying text (discussing the "logic" test).
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the defendant receives a fair trial. Concerns about biased judges'" 2
and incompetent court personnel 3 threaten a juvenile's chance to
receive a fair trial as well as a community's chance to see justice
done. The benefits of an open judicial proceeding toward securing a
fair trial are well recognized by the Supreme Court. An open trial
"gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to al concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants,
and decisions based on secret bias or partiality." 5 ' Ajuvenile, no less
than an adult defendant, wants the system to provide the best adjudication possible. "Plainly, the defendant has a right to a fair trial
but, as we have repeatedly recognized, one of the important means
of assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral observers. " 3 This assurance of fairness, of course, is bigger than any one
defendant; it refers not only to one defendant's perceptions or
whims, but to what provides the best possible proceeding systemwide.
For a check on governmental power to work, it must serve the
entire system. At the same time the public wishes to ensure that the
system is working to protect the community. Rather than being in
conflict, the right to access helps secure both the individual defendant's right to a fair trial as well as the public's right to observe and
scrutinize. Thus, the Court notes that "[t] he right to an open public
trial is a shared right of the accused and the public, the common
concern being the assurance of fairness."" Truly, the rights-and
the benefits-of public access are spread among the individual defendant, all defendants, and the community at large.
The notion that the juvenile defendant may well have something appreciable to gain from public scrutiny is well expressed in
Justice Brennan's partial concurrence and partial dissent in McKeiver.
Justice Brennan gauges the need for ajury based on the level of public scrutiny otherwise available. Following the heritage of Kent and its
progeny, Justice Brennan pins the due process question as it relates
to juveniles not "upon the basis of general characteristics of juvenile
proceedings, but only in terms of the adequacy of a particular state
See Sanbom, supra note 263, at 235-36.
See Trasen, supra note 339, at 379 (noting several criticisms of the juvenile system); see alsoJonas, supra note 172, at 310 (finding a "lack of resources and qualified personnel").
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (emphasis
added) (plurality opinion).
M Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) [hereinafter
Press32

SM Id.
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procedure to 'protect the Uuvenile] from oppression by the Government.'"'" In concurring with the Court that Pennsylvania should
not be required to engage a jury in juvenile proceedings, Justice
Brennan found solace in the fact that such proceedings in Pennsylvania were open to the public.
The availability of trial by jury allows an accused to protect himself against possible oppression by what is in essence an appeal to
the community conscience, as embodied in the jury ....[A]
similar protection may be obtained when an accused may in essence appeal to the community at large, by focusing public attention upon the facts of his trial, exposing improper judicial behavior to public view, and obtaining, if necessary, executive redress
through the medium of public indignation.
U]uveniles who fear that delinquency proceedings will mask judicial oppression may obtain adequate protection by focusing
community attention upon the trial of their cases.... Juveniles
able to bring the community's attention to bear upon their trials
may therefore draw upon a reservoir of public concern unavailable to the adult criminal defendant.3
Justice Brennan finds that Pennsylvania, a state that allows public access, provides sufficient scrutiny without requiring a jury. In
North Carolina, however, where neither ajury trial nor public access
was provided, Justice Brennan deemed protection of the defendant
insufficient: "[N]either the opinions supporting the judgment nor
the respondent... has pointed to any feature of North Carolina's
juvenile proceedings that could substitute for public or jury trial in
protecting the [juvenile defendant] against misuse of the judicial
process."' Justice Brennan has articulated that juvenile proceedings
are functionally better at providing a fair trial and a favorable outcome when they are subject to public scrutiny, either by the public or
by ajury." ° McKeiver ultimately held that states were free to use juries
S McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31
(1965)).
Id. at 554-55 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 556 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although this argument is certainly grounded in the Sixth Amendment, it is
not irrelevant to the debate over public access via Richmond Newspapers. For one
thing, in the realm of criminal proceedings, the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial and the public's First Amendment right of access to those pro-

ceedings work together. "The right to an open public trial is a shared right of the
accused and the public, the common concern being the assurance of fairness."
P ess-Enterpi , 478 U.S. at 7. In this context, the benefits and arguments for one
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in juvenile proceedings but they were not required;"' thus, public
access becomes the only remaining form of protective scrutiny.
Procedural safeguards heretofore granted by the Supreme
Court have not abated the need for public scrutiny to ensure fairness
to the defendant or to the community. There is currently widespread noncompliance with the Supreme Court's holdings in the

day-to-day operations of juvenile courts. '62 Such noncompliance can
occur because the safeguards currently required by the Court in juvenile proceedings are all, to a greater or lesser extent, self-enforced
by the judge. Without a jury or the public present, enforcement of
the Supreme Court's holdings is left to the "honor system" for juvenile court judges."" In short, largely because of the insufficient external checks on the juvenile justice system, the efforts made by the
Supreme Court in Kent, Gault Wiship, and Breed have failed to make
substantial improvements on the core injustices that brought about
those cases. '
The juvenile justice system remains itself "reformed
but not rehabilitated."s
It is important at this point to note that most children's advocates,5 " including some members of the Court, se7 have traditionally
viewed confidentiality as pro-child and have seen the call for press
and public access as anti-child. The call for access, however, is decidedly not anti-child. Public access would benefit juvenile defenright serve only to feed and underscore those for the other. In addition, the kind of
scrutinyJustice Brennan seeks does more than benefit the individual defendant. It
serves to ensure the fairness of the system toward the community at large, as well as
verifying to all members of the community that the system will remain fair should
they ever become personally involved in the criminal justice system.
See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 Ouries not a constitutional requirement in juvenile trials); id. at 548 ("There is, of course, nothing to prevent a juvenile court
judge, in a particular case where he feels the need, or when the need is demonstrated, from using an advisory jury.*).
,62 See JAMEs T. SPROwLs, DISC=anON AND LAWLESSNESS:
COMPLIANCE IN THE
JuvENILE COURT xi, 17 (1980). Sprowls goes on to say that the greatest ally to noncoupliance and unfair outcomes is the lack of public access. See id. at 69.
See id. at 85-90 (noting a lack of official oversight and insufficient unofficial
oversight via the press and public).
M4 See IRA M. SchAwA
,JUvEiEJusnCE AND PuBuc PoucY: TOWARD A NATIONAL
AGENDA

81-82 (1992).

M Id. at 81.
See, e.g., Gutmsgy, supra note 278, at 2-3 (dismissing publicity as antirehabilitative).
367 ChiefJustice Rehnquist is the foremost example. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). As the ChiefJustice stated in Smi&t "This insistence on confidentiality [in the juvenile justice system] is born of a tender concern for the welfare of the child, to hide his youthful
errors and 'bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past'" Id. (citation omitted).
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dants themselves as much as if not more than it would benefit any
other segment of society. Juvenile proceedings remain arbitrary, '
judges remain biased3 " and underquaified 7 0 and confidentiality
remains not a shield for rehabilitation, but a veil of secrecy to hide
the shortcomings of the system."" Even those individual defendants
who may think that closed proceedings would be beneficial to their
own rehabilitation may only be fooling themselves from lack of
knowledge. Such a request is likely made on an assumption that,
once behind closed doors, the juvenile judge and the rest of the system will operate in a fair and even-handed manner. If the results are
to the contrary, the juvenile's reaction will likely not be a desire to
reform, but instead "a sense of injustice that will thwart the effectiveness of even the best rehabilitative efforts."7 Ultimately, media access may be the system's salvation, not the signal of its demise.
Juvenile proceedings meet both prongs of the experience and
logic tests. An examination of history with an emphasis on the colonial era shows that access to proceedings against juveniles was clearly
enjoyed at the time the First Amendment was ratified. Since that
time, the issue has been handled in a variety of ways, the modem historical record mixed. Because of the emphasis on colonial history
when weighing experience evidence, this solid-colonial, mixedmodem record is sufficient to meet the experience test. As for the
logic test, the Supreme Court has shown in no uncertain terms that
press and public access to criminal justice proceedings behooves
both an informed and involved public and an efficient and equitable
proceeding " In addition, the scrutiny provided by public access
can aid the juvenile defendant in obtaining a fair and unbiased
trial. 7 ' In light of the close similarities between juvenile proceedings
3" The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the high level of inconsistency
in
juvenile proceedings. See supra notes 195-97, 221 and accompanying text. The
Court's "constitutional domestication" of proceedings has thus far failed to remedy
this trend. See generally SPRowLs, supranote 362.
W9See SPROWLS, supranote 362, at xi ("IT] he central finding of this study is widespread noncompliance among juvenile court judges with very specific legislative requirements .... The line between discretion and lawlessness has become
blurred.").
370 See supra note 172 and accompanying text
(discussing the difficulty for the
juvenile justice system to recruit qualified judges).
371 See supra note 349 and accompanying text (discussing the "veil of secrecy"
problem).
3"
SCHWARTZ, supranote 364, at 82.
7
See supra notes 106, 351-56 and accompanying text (discussing the "logic"
test).
34 See supra notes 357.61 and accompanying text (discussing
public access as a
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and proceedings already opened by the Supreme Court, both internal and external benefits suggest access should be allowed to juvenile proceedings.
To reiterate the Supreme Court's complete test as articulated in
Press-Enterpyise II, "If the particular proceeding in question passes
these tests of experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment
right of public access attaches. But even when a right of access attaches, it is not absolute." 5 Even so, such proceedings can be closed
to the press and public only with a state's interest of sufficient magnitude.
C. Examining the State's Interests Against OpenJuvenile Proceedings
In examining the state's interest in closed juvenile proceedings,
it is worth pausing to review exactly how significant the interest must
be to justify closure once a qualified First Amendment right has been
The state's interest must be "compelling,""
established.""678
"overriding," and have a "higher value." 79 It must be sufficiently
important that a constitutional right-access-should be compromised for its benefit. It is no wonder the Court has set such an exceptionally high bar for the state to clear.m
It is also worth taking a closer look at the "state's interest" concept itself before proceeding. A third party, usually the media, must
be denied access to a given proceeding by the trial court judge before a Richmond Newspapers-type problem can arise. Thus, the trial
court will have acted at someone's behest-either the defendant's
(the juvenile, his or her guardian(s), or counsel), the prosecutor's,
or on its own motion, probably in reliance on the state statute-to
close the proceeding."I The source of that request has been unimform of protective scrutiny for the juvenile system).
311Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) [hereinafter PressEnterpme fl].
376 For a complete discussion of this question, see supra notes 107-12
and accompan4 ng text.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).

S79 Press-Enterprise

, 478 U.S. at 14.

s

Id. at 13.
See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (discussing the state's interest
and what is required to meet this standard).
31 Regardless of which party moves for closure, the Court has addressed the interests ultimately proffered on the record in the same way. The request for closure
can, and has, come from the defendant. See Pres-Entek7pise , 478 U.S. at 3
(defendant moved to close pretrial proceeding); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 559 (1980) (plurality opinion) ('Before the trial began,
counsel for the defendant moved that it be closed to the public."). The request for
closure can and also has come from the prosecution, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Su-
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portant in considering the merits of the closure motion. Rather, the
judge's justification for that closure constitutes the state's-interest
element of the Richmond Newspapers analysis.m For the purposes of a
larger policy consideration, this Article attempts to pull together the
arguments likely to be made against access and collectively deem
them the "state's interest." 3"
Whether on its own or at the request of a juvenile defendant,'
a state now wishing to close proceedings that this Article has determined to be presumptively open will have to offer interests sufficiently compelling to justify that closure. Although a confidential juvenile delinquency proceeding presents many of the same possible
concerns as a closed adult hearing,' 5 the involvement of ajuvenile in
perior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984) (motion by media to open voir dire opposed
by the prosecution), or even from the trial court itself in response to an intervenor's
motion for access. See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 148
(1993) (trial court denied media's motion to gain access to pretrial proceeding);
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 598-99 (trial court, over the objection of the defendant,
closed courtroom).
In considering a state's interest, the Richmond Newspapers test focuses not on
the reasons proffered by any given party, but on the reasons ultimately accepted as
findings by the trial court. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581. Cf generally
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (court's acceptance and enforcement of a
party's arguments give those arguments the imprimatur of state support and thus
state action).
3
It is impossible to anticipate all theoretical reasons for closure in every single
case, as the Supreme Court recognized in Richmond Newspapers by inserting the
flexible state's-interest prong of the test. Like the Court, this Article does not purport to answer the access question in every case, but only suggests how the Richmond
Newspapers test should be applied and what its outcome should be in the majority of
cases.
Of course, one of the implicit assumptions the system makes is that most juveniles want proceedings to be held in private. As discussed suprain note 312, some
states, either in their statutory or common law, have addressed cases where the juvenile actively seeks a public audience with mixed results. Given this Article's position that access should be granted, in no small part as a check against abuses in the
system against the juvenile defendant, it seems clear that the Sixth Amendment
should extend to juvenile proceedings and allow the juvenile to demand a public
venue. Given that this Article favors the extension of Richmond Newspapers to juvenile proceedings to provide the same protections adult defendants receive from
public scrutiny, it is not the rare juvenile who senses the need for such protection
with which this Article is concerned. Rather, it is the vast majority ofjuveniles who
unwittingly throw themselves on the mercy of an arbitrary, secretive proceeding that
would benefit from the public's watchful gaze. Establishing a constitutionally mandated minimum level of public access via Richmond Newspapers would, however, also
assist the juvenile defendant seeking public access over a claim by the state, as parens
patriae, that access would be detrimental. It is, of course, this claim of beneficent
secrecy that many claim the juvenile justice system uses every day to cloak its own
shortcomings and ad hocery. See supra note 349 and accompanying text (discussing
the 'veil of secrecy" over juvenile proceedings).
so See supra notes 327-74 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of pub-
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the proceeding requires a somewhat different analysis in light of the
Supreme Court's previously articulated heightened concern for the
well being of children, even in a First Amendment context.
This concern is manifested most clearly in a pair of recent decisions involving the sale and possession of child pornography. New
York v. Ferber and Osborne v. Ohio." In Ferber, the Court upheld a
statute outlawing the sale of child pornography. The Court found
that "[s]tates are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children"' in large part because of the
state's justifiable concern with the "physiological, emotional, and
mental health of [children]."s In Osborne, the Court cites this very
language from Ferberto justify upholding a statute outlawing the possession of child pornography-even in small quantities-in one's
own home.53° In both cases, the Court underscored the need to consider the "minor factor" by refusing simply to treat the situation as it
would in a parallel case involving adult porography.391 Applying this
reasoning to juvenile proceedings, an argument could be made that
the Richmond Newspapers standard should likewise not be applied
precisely because of the involvement of minors. Despite the concern
shown by the Court in Ferber and Osborne for the well-being of children, that argument fails in the context of criminal justice proceedings-even those involving underaged defendants.

lic access).
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
495 U.S. 103 (1990).
Ferber,458 U.S. at 756.
Id. at 758.
See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108.
sO9 In Ferber, the Court struck down the court of appeals' assumption that "the
standard of obscenity... in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ... constitutes
the appropriate line dividing protected from unprotected expression .... " Ferber,
458 U.S. at 753. The Court explained:
The Miller standard... does not reflect the [s] tate's particular and
more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children. Thus, the question under the Miller test
of whether a work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of
the average person bears no connection to the issue of whether a
child has been physically or psychologically harmed by the production
of the work.... We therefore cannot conclude that the Miller standard is a satisfactory solution to the child pornography problem.
Id. at 761 (citation omitted). In Osborne, the Court refused to extend its holding in
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), a case with facts virtually identical to those in
Osborne except that the pornography in Stanley depicted adults rather than minors.
See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108.
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In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court a decision that both
pre-dated Ferber and Osborne and was cited in those opinions, the Supreme Court had already considered the general tension between a
desire to protect the general welfare of children and the First
Amendment in an access context, and come to a conclusion quite
opposite the holdings of Ferberand Osborne. One of the elements of
the pro-rehabilitation argument for closure is the notion that testifying at a public proceeding will be traumatic to the juvenile, thus
damaging his or her ability to rehabilitate and become a healthy,
noncriminal adult.393
This argument echoes the concerns the Court sounded in Ferber
and Osborne," but the stakes here are different. In Globe Newspaper,
where the issue was whether criminal proceedings could be closed
during the testimony of minor sexual assault victims, the state's interests were both to encourage such individuals to testify and also to
protect the minor "from further trauma and embarrassment."395 Although the Court deemed the interest in protecting minor sexual
assault victims "compelling," the Court held that concern for the
"physical and psychological well-being of a minor"39 did not justify
mandatory closure, mandating instead a case-by-case determination
of "whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim."'" In other words, there can be no presumption of detrimental
impact sufficient to outweigh constitutional liberties. Only specific,
empirical findings (that this child in this case will be damaged in this
way by this type of access) approach the kind of sufficiently compelling interest to consider at least partial closure of that individual
proceeding!"
The holdings in Ferber, Osborne, and Globe Newspaper, though re-sulting in differing outcomes, are not incongruous. Rather, each
case voices a similar concern-that of the well-being of minor children. The contrast exists because of the context in which this concern arises. In Ferberand Osborne, the context is child pornography-3" 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).

s93 See generally David C. Howard et al., Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings,

Rxv., July 1977, at 203 (arguing that publicity can cause psychological trauma on the juvenile defendant).
:9
See supranotes 386-91 and accompanying text (discussing Ferberand Osborne).
CLEARINGHOUSE

s5 Globe Newspaper,457 U.S. at 607.

Id.
Id. at 608 (footnote omitted).
See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (discussing the requisite elements a court must meet to order closure of a proceeding once a qualified First
Amendment right is established).
396
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one of the few forms of speech held to be entirely "outside the protection of the First Amendment" s " because the value of such speech
is "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis." 4 In Globe Newspaper, on
the other hand, the context is the criminal courtroom, where the
value of access is no less than "an essential component in our structure of self-government. " 40'
Another important contrast comes from the actual trauma the
state can legitimately claim an interest in preventing. With child
pornography, obviously, seeing the elimination of the entire experience-from the trauma of the actual production" to the haunting
effect the existence of the recording will have on the child4 0 3 -is

within the state's interest. The same cannot be said for the trauma
of testifying that the Court confronted in Globe Newspaper.4 In that
case, the Court pointed out that the state cannot claim an interest in
reducing all the trauma of the proceeding, but only "the incremental
injury suffered by testifying in the presence of the press and the general
public."4°5 Faced with only this incremental impact in Globe Newspaper,
it is only logical that the Court's holding would be far less deferential
to the needs of the child than in Ferber or Osborne, where everything
involved in child pornography lacks value, First Amendment or otherwise.
The state can claim an even smaller incremental interest in the
trauma and stigmatization of juvenile delinquency proceedings than
it could in Globe Newspaper. For one thing, given the increasingly
criminal, punitive tone of delinquency proceedings, mere involvement in the process has itself become a stigmatizing event for juvenile defendants. 4" Further, through the post-adjudicatory release of
3" NewYork v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982).
40 Id. at 762.
401 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606. The full comment reads, 'And in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and
serve as a check upon the judicial process---an essential component in our structure
of self-government." Id.
SSee Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
403 See id. at 760.
Nor, for that matter, can the same be said about the trauma of juvenile proceedings on the defendant.
4G5 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607 n.19.
See ToRt~rrr AL., supra note 280, at 16 (sentencing and dispositions increasingly favor punitive incarceration); see also supra notes 264, 277-80 and accompanyingtext (discussing the punitive nature of today's juvenile system).
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1967) (the term juvenile delinquent "has
come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term 'criminal' applied to
adults'); see also Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81
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court records, any negative impact of public knowledge of delinquency is already occurring to many, if not most, former juvenile delinquents. As the Court explained in Gaut4
Juvenile Courts are sometimes defended by a statement that it is
the law's policy "to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the
public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past."
This claim of secrecy, however, is more rhetoric than reality. Disclosure
of court records is discretionary with the judge in most jurisdictions. Statutory restrictions almost invariably apply only to the
court records, and even as to those the evidence is that many
courts routinely furnish information to the FBI and the military,
and on request to government agencies and even to private employers.4
The degree to which a juvenile's past indiscretions are already
public knowledge has greatly increased since the Court's ruling thirty
years ago. "Formerly private, juvenile court records are increasingly
available to a wide variety of people."4 All but a few states have provisions for release of juvenile court records to "at least one of the following parties: the public, the victim(s), the school(s), the prosecutor, law enforcement, or social agenc[ies]."4 10 As the Gina Grant
case4 1' vividly illustrates, long-term confidentiality of juvenile delinquency is today nearly always rhetoric and never reality.
The threat to a juvenile's liberty in a delinquency proceeding
creates an even greater contrast between delinquency proceedings
and Ferber and Osborne than there was with Globe Newspaper. Unlike
the minor witness in Globe Newspaper,juvenile defendants have been
brought before the court for committing some sort of malfeasance,
for which the court must determine a proper legal response. Thus,
if one accepts the arguments made by the Supreme Court not only
in the Richmond Newspapers cases, but also by Justice Brennan in
McKeiver,41 3 public scrutiny can benefit the juvenile defendant, counMICH. L. REv. 1540, 1549 (1983) ('In theory the court's action was to affix no stigmatizing label. In fact a delinquent is generally viewed by employers, schools, the
armed services--by society generally-as a criminal.").
4_ Gault, 387 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
Toasr ErrAL., supra note 280, at 36.
410 Id. at 38.

In 1995, Gina Grant's early offer of admission to Harvard University was rescinded when the university was made aware that Ms. Grant had killed her mother
five years earlier, at the age of 14, in Columbia, South Carolina. See Alice Dembner
411

& Jon Auerback, Pupil'sPast Clouds Her Future: Harvard Rescinds Offer After Learning
That Honors Student Kiiled HerMother, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1995, at 1.
4:
See supra Part II (for a discussion of Richmond Newspapers and its progeny).
411 See supra notes 357-61 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's
concurrence in McKeiver).

1222

SETON HALL LAWREVEW

[Vol. 28:1155

tervailing the negative impact of publicity. In the sharpest contrast,
there is obviously no countervailing benefit to the child--or society-in child pornography.
Though it is indeed "evident beyond the need for elaboration"414 that the introduction of children into the constitutional
equation warrants a somewhat different "weighing" of the constitutional issues, the degree to which such a reshuffling would affect the
outcome of a Richmond Newspapers analysis in the case of juvenile
proceedings is unclear. Where there are real constitutional concerns
on both sides, the Richmond Newspapers test provides a sufficiently
flexible rubric to weigh the impact of the defendant's status as a minor all within the basic two-step, three-prong test.
A concern for the general welfare of children may be implicit in
the analysis of trial courts, but rarely is it specifically articulated as a
major concern in access cases. Rather, the interest relied upon time
and time again by courts in justifying closed juvenile proceedings
can be summarized in one word-rehabilitation.4
The state argues
that publicity will create a stigmatizing trauma that will, in turn, destroy the juvenile's chances to rehabilitate himself or herself, thereby
effectively eliminating the child's chance for a fresh start 416 The entire purpose of the juvenile justice system is "saving children;" 41 7 thus,
414
415

NewYork v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
A sampling of state supreme courts as well as the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals reveals an automaton-like recitation of rehabilitation as the driving force
behind confidentiality statutes, as well as the juvenile justice system generally.
There was also an absence of any other articulated interest. See generally Brian W. v.
Superior Court, 574 P.2d 788, 791 (Cal. 1978) ("The provisions for confidentiality
in the juvenile court law.., were included to prevent the underlying rehabilitative
philosophy from being thwarted by unduly stigmatizing the juvenile offender."); In
reJ.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 72 (D.C. 1991) ("The primary purpose... [for] provid[ing]
that in general the public shall be excluded from juvenile proceedings, is to preserve the anonymity of juvenile respondents in order to foster an atmosphere conducive to rehabilitation"); Florida Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 322 S.E.2d 233, 235-36
(Ga. 1984) ("The asserted state interest in the closure of the hearing was the protection of the anonymity of the juvenile offender in order to further his or her rehabilitation."); In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990) (aim of traditionally closed
juvenile proceedings is rehabilitative); In re M.C., 527 N.W.2d 290, 293 (S.D. 1995)
("The purpose behind closed juvenile proceedings is to 'protectively rehabilitate
juveniles."); In reJ.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1128 (Vt. 1981) (juvenile proceedings sole
concern is rehabilitation of the juvenile delinquent).
416 See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (state did not want to allow
adult defendant to use witness'juvenile record for fear that "exposure of ajuvenile's
record of delinquency would likely cause impairment of rehabilitative goals of the
juvenile correctional procedures"); see also Geis, supranote 147, at 101.
411There is a particularly philanthropic explanation of
the purpose of juvenile
justice in Huz.y, supra note 154, at 11-12. Hurley explains:
It is not the objective of the Juvenile Court to punish the children
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any element that diminishes the chances of rehabilitation would, in
theory, undercut the entire system." '
Even assuming that rehabilitation was within the power of the
juvenile justice system and that publicity had a detrimental effect on
such rehabilitation, that alone is likely insufficient to outweigh a
constitutional right such as the right to access established by the experience and logic tests.4 19 The Supreme Court has considered similar interests in other cases and found that the interest of the child,
though compelling, can be outweighed by constitutional rights of
other parties. For example, in Davis v. Alaska,4" the Court considered whether the state's interest in concealing a witness's history of
delinquency was sufficient to prevent the use of that information to
impeach a witness.

It held that it was not. 42

While the Court ex-

plained that it "[did] not and need not challenge the State's interest... [in] seek[ing] to preserve the anonymity of a juvenile offender[,]"' the Court made it clear that this interest had its limits.
Between the desire to protect children from publicity and the criminally accused defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses,
the Court placed the latter right squarely above the former interest.
The Court held that "the right of confrontation is paramount to the
State's policy of protecting ajuvenile offender. Whatever temporary
embarrassment might result ... is outweighed by petitioner's right to
probe into the influence of possible bias."4" The state's desire to allow the juvenile to testify "free from embarrassment and with his
reputation unblemished must fall before the right of petitioner to
seek out the truth in the process of defending himself."44 Whatever
weight the state's interest should be accorded, "[t]he State's policy
brought before it. In fact, the entire thought of those who framed the
law was to banish all idea of crime and punishment and to overcome
entirely the positive evil of ajail commitment and a formal trial.
Id. He continues, stating that the "little thing" (the juvenile) is unprotected from
falling into vice because "there is no wise, guiding hand to turn him back into the
'straight and narrow way,' and no voice to warn him that the shining thing which
looks so red and luscious is only a dead sea-apple that will turn to ashes in his
hand." Id. at 12.
418 For a detailed argument that confidentiality is vital to delinquent rehabilitation, see generally Kathleen M. Laubenstein, Comment, Media Access tojuvenikjusrice: Should Freedom of the Press be Limited to Promote Rehabilitation of Youthful Offenders,

68 TFmp. L. Rrv. 1897 (1995).

See supraPart I1 (discussing the Supreme Court's experience and logic test).
M 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
421 See id. at
320.
M Id. at 319.
419

M

424

Id.

Id. at 320.
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interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness."z
The Court in Davis was not arguing that the state's interest was
outweighed by a right as substantial as the general right to crossexamine an accusing witness, or even the right within that right to
cross-examine those witnesses with regard to potential biases.
Rather, the Court in this case held that the state's interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile for rehabilitative purposes was
outweighed by the defendant's right to cross-examine the juvenile
using his delinquency record. The Court so held over the objection of
the Alaska Supreme Court, which previously found that "counsel for
the defendant was able adequately to question the youth in considerable detail concerning the possibility of bias or motive."4 Thus,
the use of a juvenile record of only moderate utility to the defendant's cross-examination of a single witness still outweighed the possible negative impact of the juvenile witness's previous delinquency
becoming public knowledge in open court.
Though the Richmond Newspapers equation remains the same regardless of the origin of the state's interests in the trial court's findings, it is worth considering how the equation may differ when it is
the defendant or his or her guardians arguing, as I suggest above,
that in fact this child's chances of rehabilitation in this case will indeed be hindered by press and public access. As in adult criminal
trials, there may certainly be isolated extreme cases where closure is
warranted. Simply moving the rehabilitative argument from the
general to the specific in most cases, however, is not likely to alter
the outcome. While an appeal from an individual defendant claiming that public access would damage his or her personal health and
well-being comes closer to the general concern for children expressed by the Court in Globe Newspaper, Ferber, and Osborne, the
proper response to such a claim is to continue the Richmond Newspapers test, and weigh whatever evidence the juvenile brings forth
within that analysis. If there is no general program for rehabilitation
available,42 a claim that access diminishes the juvenile's chance for
rehabilitation loses its power, regardless of the source of the argument. One can imagine, however, a situation where the juvenile offers, for example, psychological testimony or other unique evidence
M2

Id.

Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Alaska 1972).
See infra notes 430-33 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of rehabilitative programs).
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about his or her own case. The trial court's job, strictly within the
Richmond Newspapers test, is to weigh such evidence in determining
what level of access the press and public should be allowed.
The generic fears of diminished rehabilitation or protection of
the juvenile's welfare are likely insufficient to justify closing juvenile
courts. The assumption that access would somehow destroy the very
raisond'etre of the juvenile court, however, is debatable at best. Some
argue that access will assist in putting the child on the road to real
rehabilitation by showing him or her that his or her actions were
wrong.4" Regarding the claim that publicity would negatively impact
rehabilitation, Gilbert Geis has said, "It is believed, though it has
never been empirically demonstrated."4 Many juvenile courts have
operated and continue to operate with some degree of publicity,
thus undercutting the notion that publicity will be the death of the
juvenile justice system. Furthermore, solving this psychological
quandary over the impact of publicity on rehabilitation is not necessary to address the constitutional issue presented here. In resolving
the access debate, it is not needed to determine how publicity would
affect a program of rehabilitation because there is no program of rehabilitationfrom which juvenile delinquents would possibly be shying
away,' and in most instances there never was.4"' Simply put, the prescription has never matched the description: its theories flawed, 32 its
courts like criminal trials, " and its "homes" like jails and prisons, the
juvenile justice system that existed in the minds of reformers has essentially never existed anywhere else. In fact, the great irony of the
debate over media access, as well as the juvenile justice system in
general, may be that all the fuss has been over a system that never
got off the ground, and the bits of it that did came crashing down
See, e.g., United States v. Three Juveniles, 862 F. Supp. 651, 658-59 (D. Mass.
1994), aff'd, 61 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1564 (1996) (noting
that juveniles may "benefit, in a rehabilitative way, from the public opprobrium attached to these charged acts").
4
Geis, supra note 147, at 102.
430 See supra Part IV (discussing the shortcomings of the juvenile
justice system
and its lack of rehabilitative programs).
431 See generallyFox, supra note 143, at 1229-35 (noting that the
reform movement
was far more rhetoric and propaganda, and that there were no substantive moves
toward genuine rehabilitative efforts); see also RYERON, supra note 170, at 137-48
(concluding that we as a nation have lost faith in the rehabilitative ideal and that
the *uvenile court system never succeeded in achieving a rehabilitative model).
4A See supra notes 184-97 and accompanying text (discussing the
parens patriae
rationale underlying the juvenile justice system, and its diminished credibility).
03 See supra notes 227-73 and accompanying
text (discussing the similarities between juvenile proceedings and adult criminal trials).
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soon thereafter. In many ways, fighting tooth and nail to maintain
confidential hearings, while failing to develop and further a rehabilitative regime, has served only to hide the flaws and inefficiendes of
the system. This myth of beneficent secrecy can only harm those juveniles currently being herded through the system. 4"
Interests in shielding juveniles from the public gaze to prevent
embarrassment or to encourage rehabilitation boil down to a fundamental state's interest in the general welfare of children. Even
where the juvenile offers individualized evidence and arguments that
access would be detrimental to his or her own psychological health,
it is the larger society's interest in "'the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens'" 4" that drives the
state's interest in the youth's rehabilitation. Having accepted the
rhetoric regarding the benefits of secrecy, states naturally capitulated
and passed statutes limiting access to juvenile proceedings. 436 The
benefits of secrecy, though, have become increasingly questionable,
while the detriments of justice done in a dark comer have become
increasingly manifest. Many have argued that confidentiality does
the children involved more harm than good-that the "veil of secrecy.., is perpetuated more to protect those who work within the
state bureaucracies than to maintain the anonymity of those who are
compelled to endure being 'saved' by the system of juvenile justice. "43' At the same time, it is not a compelling interest to protect a
child from publicity in order to avoid damaging a rehabilitative regime that does not exist. Justice Brennan noted in Globe Newspaper
that the state can claim an interest only in shielding a child from the
incremental difference between what would occur without access
and what would occur with access. 4"
Where there is no rehabilitation, the state's interest in preserving the rehabilitative process boils down to an incremental interest
in the protection of nothing. Likewise, the claim of an individual
defendant that closure is necessary to preserve his or her ability to
The ill effects of secrecy are especially acute because many members of the
public, while frustrated with the current system, still support the ideal of rehabilitadon for youthful offenders--if done properly. See supra note 324 (detailing the
public's preference for rehabilitation over punishment).
435 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
4 See supranotes 311-13 and accompanying text (citing several state statutes
limitin%access to juvenile proceedings).
MuRPHY, supra note 202, at viii; see also generally Trasen, supra note 339; supra
note 349 and accompanying text.
48 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 n.19 (1982).
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rehabilitate, also relying on the juvenile justice system to facilitate
such a reform, is nothing more than an empty reliance on a dysfunctional system. Finally, given the punitive, criminal nature of the proceeding, the psychological trauma of a public juvenile delinquency
proceeding is likely to be nearly identical to the trauma of the same
proceeding conducted behind closed doors-hardly a sufficiently
compelling justification for closure.43
Any special interest the state may have in closing juvenile proceedings falls far short of the kind of compelling interest required
under the First Amendment. That is not to say that there are never
cases that warrant partial or even complete closure of a juvenile proceeding. To preserve the public's First Amendment right of access,
however, the constitutional minimum is a presumption of openness
as currently enjoyed in most other criminal justice proceedings. In
weighing arguments against that presumption, the determination
must be made with the same heavy hand currently prescribed for
other criminal justice proceedings in the Richmond Newspapers line of
cases. The qualified First Amendment right of access to juvenile
proceedings established above cannot be systematically denied by
slogans, talismans, or rhetoric. Only on a narrow, case-by-case basis
should juvenile delinquency proceedings be closed to the press and
public. Of course, this type of judicial scrutiny could be a basis for
some amount of concern that decisions will be made arbitrarily.4 °
Still, a Richmond Newspapers analysis at a minimum would substantially
reducejudicial discretion in half of the states today by at least requiring that the judge not act on instinct or bias, but that the reason for
closure be '"articulated along with findings specific enough that a
reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered."4" In these twenty-five states, judges are either explicitly
granted discretion, 2 allowed to determine access bounded only by a
3 or given no guidance at all
vague "direct" or "proper" interest test,4"
about what level of discretion they are granted to open proceedings! " In the other half of the nation, legislatures have mandated a
0 See Note, Public Right of Access, supra note 407, at 1557-58 ("Nor does the
in-

cremental effect of publicity seem likely to intensify the psychological identification
process beyond the labeling influence of the legal proceedings and records themselves.").
40
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See supra note 43 (discussing the discretion vested injudges).
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986) [hereinafter

Pre .-Enterptise H1.
4

t See supra note 311 and accompanying text (seven states).
See supra note 313 and accompanying text (sixteen states).
See supra note 314 and accompanying text (two states).
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test of scrutiny commensurate to that of Richmond Newspapers" or an
access policy that goes beyond the constitutional minimum, 0 as is
their prerogative." 7 While the First Amendment right of access here
is "not absolute," ' precluding any black-and-white rule that would
avoid altogether the risk of judicial ad hocety, the extension of Richmond Newspapers to juvenile proceedings and the establishment of a
constitutional minimum level of access would constitute a great leap
forward.
VI. CONCLUSION: OPEN THE DOORS49

The debate over access to juvenile proceedings has been a clash
of idealism and rhetoric against pragmatism and reality. Catching
and curing criminal instincts during an individual's youth is nothing
less than a praiseworthy aim. Not even the Supreme Court, however,
could deny that the juvenile justice system's "reach [had] exceeded
[its] grasp,"40 and that a system that started out protecting children
from an uncaring establishment soon became something from which
juvenile defendants desperately needed protection. The reformers'
visions gave way to a struggling, arbitrary, and secretive order, unable
to offer juvenile defendants anything better than the luck of the
draw.
During these struggles, failures, and valiant attempts by the juvenile justice system, the public was left decidedly out of the loop.
Confidentiality, intended only to help those juveniles in the system,
too soon became a veil of incompetence, and a shield for failure.
The stinging irony in that secrecy is that public access and genuine
community involvement may have helped curb the shortcomings
and address the problems. Our democracy, our Constitution, and
our society rely on a well-informed and properly-involved public to
ensure that our government never loses sight of for whom it works
and to whom it is accountable. The Supreme Court has recognized
"b See supranote 310 and accompanying text (nine states).
44

See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text (fifteen states).

Cf, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 548 (1971) (mandating
that juries are not required in juvenile proceedings, but allowing states the freedom to utilize juries at their discretion).
4" Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) [hereinafter PresuEnteipriseH1l.
"9 This is taken from the title ofJudge Martin's article. See genr-ally Martin, supra
note 318.
450 McKeive, 403 U.S. at 546 n.6 (quoting PRmEIDENT'S COMMISSiON ON
LAW
JuvENmyE
ENFORCEMENr AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTicE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
DEUiNnQUENcANDYOtm CR1ME 9 (1967)).
"7
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that the system must serve the public and that the public must monitor the system.
For all its lofty goals, and for all its enlightened rhetoricindeed maybe because of it-the juvenile justice system is not and
should not be immune from these larger lessons. Having become a
sprawling network of courts and post-adjudicatory institutions, handling not just hapless miscreants but the most deadly of professional
criminals, the juvenile justice system is in dire need of the kind of
thoughtful, reasoned reform that can only come from an open-and
informed-debate.
Lest we forget, we as a society have entrusted collectively the fate
of many of our children to this institution. A paper shield of rhetoric and an assurance of benevolence is cold comfort against an arbitrary or incompetent judge, a sentence not commensurate with the
crime, or a barbaric prison with a euphemistic moniker. A blind
promise to protect and serve is equally unfulfilling to a community
rocked by violence, no matter what the age of the perpetrators. For
both groups, neither one deserving to be ignored any longer, allowing the light of day to flood the halls of juvenile justice once and for
all may be the last, best hope to repair a system that has shortchanged everyone while pleasing no one.
The Supreme Court speculated that there may be a time when
the juvenile court experiment had sufficiently failed to require its
dissolution. "Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one
day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it."4-"
Twenty-five years ago, writing the system off meant allowing public
access commensurate with an adult criminal trial. Today, that kind
of public scrutiny, hopefully providing sufficient support for real reform to this nearly century-old experiment, may be the only way to
reverse the "ultimate disillusionment" many still feel toward the juvenile justice system.
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Id. at 551.

